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I. INTRODUCTION
Italian Colors Restaurant, a small merchant in California, decided to
contract with American Express to accommodate wealthy consumers and
corporate clients who use the American Express personal and corporate
charge cards.1 Under the provisions of the American Express agreement,
Italian Colors was also forced to accept American Express’s generalpurpose credit card, which does not attract a similarly affluent and
profitable clientele.2 But for American Express’s “Honor All Cards”
policy, most merchants would not accept the general-purpose credit card
because it does not bring in enough profit to justify the higher fees that
come with it.3 Nevertheless, American Express charged the same merchant
discount fee on both the charge and credit cards, which is about thirty-five
percent higher than its competitors at Visa and MasterCard.4 Thus, not
only did Italian Colors have to accept a credit card it would not otherwise,
it lost an additional seventy cents on every such purchase.5 American

1. See Amended Complaint at ¶¶ 1, 3, 24-25, In re Am. Express Merch. Litig.,
No. 03-cv-09592-GBD (S.D.N.Y. Feb. 19, 2009) (noting that American Express issues
corporate charge cards to 70% of Fortune 500 companies).
2. See id. at ¶¶ 2, 33 (explaining that all merchants contracting with American
Express were required to accept any card bearing the American Express name,
trademark, logo, or service mark).
3. See id. at ¶¶ 19, 36 (noting that the general-purpose credit card, unlike the
charge card, does not require cardholders to pay off their full balance at the end of
every month).
4. See id. at ¶¶ 22, 36 (noting that American Express charges a merchant discount
fee of 2.7% for all of its cards, whereas Visa and MasterCard each impose a 2.0%
merchant discount fee).
5. See id. at ¶ 17 (claiming the merchants were damaged by having to accept the
credit cards that could impose a higher fee than would prevail absent the tying
arrangement).
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Express’s policy of conditioning the availability of the corporate charge
card on the merchants’ agreement to also accept their general-purpose
credit card is considered a “tying” arrangement, which may be per se
illegal under the federal antitrust laws.6
Italian Colors filed suit and sought to certify a class of similarly
aggrieved merchants.7 Unfortunately for Italian Colors, the merchant
agreement they signed with American Express included an arbitration
clause prohibiting merchants from participating as a class or acting in a
representative capacity.8 According to an expert economist, Italian Colors
and similar small merchants could only hope to receive less than six
thousand dollars in trebled damages for a claim that could cost one million
dollars in expert fees.9 Italian Colors was then at a crossroads because it
did not have the resources to pay for arbitration, and it could not spread the
costs amongst those merchants who could also bring a claim.10 As a result,
no merchant could feasibly pursue arbitration and American Express did
not have to face consequences for illegal activity.11
Italian Colors and its fellow merchants successfully raised this argument
in the Second Circuit, which held that a class action waiver that makes
individual arbitration prohibitively expensive is unenforceable as a de facto
waiver of liability for American Express if the merchants have no suitable
forum through which they can vindicate their rights.12 American Express
6. See, e.g., Jefferson Parish Hosp. Dist. No. 2 v. Hyde, 466 U.S. 2, 2, 10 (1984)
(acknowledging a per se illegal tying arrangement exists when a seller possessing
sufficient market power for the tying product exploits its control to force buyers to
purchase a separate product the buyer either did not want or would have purchased
elsewhere on different terms).
7. See In re Am. Express Merch. Litig. (Italian Colors III), 667 F.3d 204, 207 (2d
Cir.) (describing the purported class as all merchants who accepted American Express
credit cards as a result of accepting American Express charge cards), reh’g en banc
denied, 681 F.3d 139 (2d Cir.), cert. granted sub nom. Am. Express Co. v. Italian
Colors Rest., 133 S. Ct. 594 (2012), overruled by, 133 S. Ct. 2304 (2013).
8. See id. at 209 (outlining the dispute resolution clause under which merchants
may only bring a claim individually in arbitration or small claims court).
9. See id. at 218 (citing an economic study stating that the plaintiffs’ costs could
exceed one million dollars, where the average merchant could expect $5252 or less in
trebled damages).
10. See id. (citing an economist’s opinion that it would be economically irrational
for an individual merchant to arbitrate).
11. See Carnegie v. Household Int’l, Inc., 376 F.3d 656, 661 (7th Cir. 2004)
(recognizing that when a plaintiff’s expected damages are infinitesimal compared to
potential costs and no claims can be aggregated, no plaintiff will bring a claim); see
also Italian Colors III, 667 F.3d at 209-11 (noting the merchants in this action cannot
afford to arbitrate unless they can proceed as a class).
12. See Italian Colors III, 667 F.3d at 204 (concluding that the arbitration
agreement was unenforceable because the plaintiffs could not proceed in arbitration

http://digitalcommons.wcl.american.edu/jgspl/vol21/iss4/7

4

Wolf: "To a Hammer Everything Looks Like a Nail": The Supreme Court's .

2013]

DISTINGUISHING CONCEPCION

955

challenged the Second Circuit’s holding, posing the question to the
Supreme Court of “[w]hether the Federal Arbitration Act permits courts,
invoking the ‘federal substantive law of arbitrability’ to invalidate
arbitration agreements on the ground that they do not permit class
arbitration of a federal statutory claim.”13 Based in part on the Court’s
recent decision in AT&T Mobility LLC v. Concepcion,14 the Supreme Court
held that the merchants did not present a legitimate “vindication of rights”
claim and that the Federal Arbitration Act (FAA) required the Court to
enforce the arbitration agreement.15
This Comment argues that an arbitration agreement in an adhesion
contract that precludes class arbitration and makes individual arbitration
prohibitively expensive is unenforceable under the FAA because it
effectively prevents plaintiffs from vindicating their federal statutory
rights.16 This Comment also argues that Italian Colors is distinguishable
from Concepcion because the merchants demonstrated arbitration was
prohibitively expensive, and because the FAA should not be construed to
override the substantive rights afforded by other federal statutes.17
Part II examines how courts interpret the savings clause of the FAA to
hold arbitration agreements unenforceable, specifically when arbitration in
a particular plaintiff’s case does not provide an adequate forum for the
vindication of federal statutory rights.18 Part II also discusses Concepcion
and the Supreme Court’s recent decision in Italian Colors, rejecting the
vindication of rights doctrine as to the merchants’ claim that American
Express’s arbitration agreement was unenforceable.19
without incurring prohibitive costs).
13. Petition for Writ of Certiorari at i, Am. Express Co., 2012 WL 3091064 (No.
12-133).
14. 131 S. Ct. 1740, 1750 (2011) (holding a California law barring many class
action waivers was preempted by the FAA for allegedly disfavoring arbitration).
15. See American Express Co. v. Italian Colors Restaurant, 133 S. Ct. 2304, 231012 (2013) (holding that there was no congressional command to invalidate the
arbitration agreement and that the Court’s precedents did not require invalidating an
arbitration agreement where the plaintiffs merely could not afford to prove their claim).
16. See Italian Colors III, 667 F.3d at 219 (holding an arbitration agreement
containing a class action waiver unenforceable because allowing the plaintiffs to
aggregate their claims was the only economically rational way to vindicate their
statutory rights).
17. See id. at 213 (holding that Concepcion did not control the question presented
because substantive rights under federal law were at stake, as opposed to state contract
law).
18. See infra Part II (outlining how the FAA has been interpreted by the courts, and
how the Supreme Court established the vindication of rights doctrine applied in Italian
Colors III).
19. See infra Part II (explaining how the Supreme Court rejected the Second
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Part III argues that the Supreme Court should have held that the
vindication of rights doctrine falls squarely under the FAA, and that the
Second Circuit properly held American Express’s arbitration agreement
unenforceable vis-à-vis Italian Colors.20 Part III also asserts that
Concepcion is distinguishable as addressing purely state law, and argues
that Supreme Court precedent establishes that a plaintiff may assert a
prohibitive costs defense regardless of the form of those prohibitive costs.21
Part IV offers policy arguments for ratifying the vindication of rights
doctrine in order to preserve the viability of small-dollar claims.22 Finally,
Part V concludes that had the Court invalidated the kinds of arbitration
agreements crafted by American Express, future courts could have ensured
that the FAA is reconciled with other federal statutes and make arbitration
agreements as enforceable as other contracts.23
II. BACKGROUND
A. The Federal Arbitration Act, Preemption, and Federal Harmonization
The FAA, enacted in 1925, was intended to reverse judicial hostility to
the arbitral forum and ensure arbitration agreements are as enforceable as
any other contract.24 Thus, Congress established a mandate to enforce
arbitration agreements according to their terms and resolve doubts as to the
breadth of an agreement in favor of arbitration.25 Contract disputes are
generally arbitrable, unless the contested issue relates to the making and
performance of the arbitration clause itself.26
Circuit’s attempt to distinguish the Court’s recent opinion in Concepcion).
20. See infra Part III (arguing that even if an arbitration agreement must be upheld
in cases that may affect the vindication of state-law rights, the FAA should not be
extended to prevent the vindication of federal statutory rights).
21. See infra Part III (concluding that the holding in Concepcion should be limited
to questions of state law but that its comparison of bilateral and class arbitration should
be applied to the question of prohibitive costs).
22. See infra Part IV (discussing the importance of the class action mechanism in
small-dollar claims).
23. See infra Part V (concluding that the vindication of rights doctrine is necessary
to ensure plaintiffs who would incur prohibitive costs can still pursue a claim).
24. See generally 9 U.S.C. § 2 et seq. (2006); Vaden v. Discover Bank, 129 S. Ct.
1262, 1274 (2009) (describing the “ouster” doctrine, under which courts refrained from
ordering parties to submit their claims to arbitration despite an arbitration agreement
because those clauses ‘ousted’ the courts of their jurisdiction).
25. See Moses H. Cone Mem’l Hosp. v. Mercury Constr. Corp., 460 U.S. 1, 24
(1983) (finding a congressional declaration of a liberal policy favoring arbitration and
that questions of arbitrability must be addressed with a “healthy regard” for
arbitration).
26. See Prima Paint Corp. v. Flood & Conklin Mfg. Corp., 388 U.S. 395, 404
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Since enactment of the FAA, courts have upheld arbitration agreements
so long as the agreement does not violate general principles of state
contract law or directly undermine the substantive federal statutory rights at
issue.27 Section Two of the FAA, known as the Act’s savings clause,
provides that any contract agreeing to settle disputes in arbitration is “valid,
irrevocable, and enforceable, save upon such grounds as exist at law or in
equity for the revocation of any contract.”28 Courts can invalidate
arbitration agreements under state contract law for the same defenses that
would render any contract unenforceable, such as fraud, duress, or
unconscionability, so long as the defenses proffered do not arise
specifically because an agreement to arbitrate is at issue.29
When a state law is in direct conflict with a federal law or impedes a
federal objective, the federal law may preempt the state law.30 When two
federal laws are in conflict, however, preemption is not a concern; instead,
courts must make an effort to balance the interests of both federal statutes
and give weight to each.31 When one statute is more recent than the other,
courts must give effect to the latest statute while allowing the earlier
legislative expression to continue to operate.32 Courts should not assume
(1967) (holding that an arbitrator could resolve a claim of “fraud in the inducement”
because the fraud related to the contract generally, rather than the making of the
arbitration agreement); see also Southland Corp. v. Keating, 465 U.S. 1, 12 (1984)
(holding the Act was applicable in state court because the legislative history suggested
Congress did not intend to confine arbitrations to only those seeking enforcement in
federal court).
27. See, e.g., Morrison v. Circuit City Stores, 317 F.3d 646, 663 (6th Cir. 2003) (en
banc) (holding an arbitration agreement containing cost-splitting and remedy-limitation
provisions unenforceable for undermining the deterrent and remedial purposes of Title
VII).
28. 9 U.S.C. § 2 (2012); see also Doctor’s Assoc., Inc. v. Casarotto, 517 U.S. 681,
687 (1996) (recognizing that the FAA savings clause permits courts to invalidate
arbitration agreements for contract defenses such as fraud, duress, or
unconscionability).
29. See, e.g., Perry v. Thomas, 482 U.S. 483, 492, 493 n.9 (1987) (limiting
unconscionability as a defense when the theory is derived from the uniqueness of
arbitration).
30. See, e.g., Silkwood v. Kerr-McGee Corp., 464 U.S. 238, 248 (1984) (noting
further that state law can be preempted when Congress evinced an intention to occupy
the field).
31. See Pennsylvania v. Dep’t of Health & Human Servs., 723 F.2d 1114, 1119 (3d
Cir. 1983) (noting that “statutory provisions enacted at different times [are] read as
harmoniously as possible”).
32. See Int’l Union of Elec. Radio & Mach. Workers, AFL-CIO v. NLRB, 289
F.2d 757, 761 (D.C. Cir. 1960) (concluding that when successive enactments are
inconsistent, a court must resolve the ambiguity to give effect to the latest statute and
still allow the earlier statute to be operative).
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that legislators intended to render an earlier statute in the United States
Code superfluous when interpreting two conflicting federal statutes.33
B. Supreme Court Precedent Establishing the Vindication of Rights
Doctrine
Federal statutory claims are arbitrable so long as Congress did not
indicate a desire to foreclose arbitration of the particular statutory right at
issue, including claims under the antitrust laws.34 If the agreement to
arbitrate requires potential litigants to forgo federal substantive rights,
however, the agreement is unenforceable because the plaintiffs cannot
effectively vindicate their rights in arbitration.35
In Mitsubishi Motors, the Court considered whether to adopt a
categorical rule to bar antitrust claims from arbitration.36 The Court
declined to adopt such a rule because Congress did not explicitly intend to
preclude antitrust claims from arbitration and there was no inherent conflict
between the two.37 Moreover, the plaintiffs did not contest that the statute
could not function as Congress intended in arbitration or that they would
have to forgo the substantive rights afforded by the statute.38 The Court
held, however, that an arbitration agreement is only enforceable “so long as
the prospective litigant effectively may vindicate its statutory cause of
action in the arbitral forum.”39 Indeed, as long as arbitration merely
provides a change in forum but does not affect any substantive rights in the
underlying statutory scheme, an arbitration agreement does not run afoul of
33. See Bilski v. Kappos, 130 S. Ct. 3218, 3228 (2010) (finding that an
interpretation of one statute which would render enforcement of the earlier statute
impracticable was impermissible).
34. See Mitsubishi Motors Corp. v. Soler Chrysler-Plymouth, Inc., 473 U.S. 614,
636-37 (1975) (holding that antitrust claims were arbitrable because there was no
congressional indication in the text or legislative history of the Sherman Act that the
statute protected against waiver of the right to a judicial forum).
35. See id. at 637 n.19 (acknowledging the Court would readily condemn an
agreement that effectively operated as a prospective waiver of a party’s right to pursue
statutory remedies).
36. See id. at 623-25 (rejecting the premise that an arbitration agreement could not
protect the viability of federal statutory claims that would typically protect the nondrafter without an agreement to arbitrate those particular statutory claims).
37. See id. at 633-34 (reasoning that the complexity of antitrust claims alone was
insufficient to rule as a matter of law that antitrust claims were inherently inconsistent
with arbitration).
38. See id. at 637 (indicating that the antitrust laws would continue to serve both
their remedial and deterrent functions so long as the plaintiffs could effectively
vindicate their rights).
39. See id. (declining to speculate as to whether the particular agreement at issue in
fact had such an effect on the claimant’s federal statutory rights).
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this principle.40 Since Mitsubishi Motors, the Court has found that
arbitration is not inherently inconsistent with the federal statutes often
applicable to contracts containing arbitration agreements, such as the
Securities Exchange Act and the Age Discrimination in Employment Act.41
In addition to the requirement that a plaintiff must get the full benefit of
the substantive rights provided for in the statute, plaintiffs may not be
subjected to arbitration if they could not bring a claim without incurring
prohibitive costs.42 In Green Tree, a financial institution compelled a
mobile home purchaser to arbitrate her claims under the Truth in Lending
Act and the Equal Credit Opportunity Act.43 The plaintiff alleged that
Green Tree’s agreement, which was silent as to arbitration expenses, posed
the risk that arbitration would be financially inaccessible.44
Acknowledging that possibility, the Court held a plaintiff alleging that
arbitration would be prohibitively expensive bears the burden of proving
the likelihood of incurring such costs.45 In sum, Green Tree adds to the
“effective vindication” equation the requirement that a plaintiff should not
incur prohibitive costs.46
The combination of the tests arising out of Mitsubishi Motors and Green
40. See id. at 628 (finding that a party only agrees to a change in forum by
assenting to an arbitration agreement, and does not agree to forgo any substantive
rights).
41. See Gilmer v. Interstate/Johnson Lane Corp., 500 U.S. 20, 31-32 (1991)
(holding that claims under the ADEA were arbitrable because the arbitrators had the
power to grant the same remedies and equitable relief that a plaintiff could receive in
court); see also Shearson/Am. Express, Inc. v. McMahon, 482 U.S. 220, 230 (1987)
(concluding that absent obvious legislative intent and any apparent conflict, plaintiffs’
statutory claims were arbitrable because they could realize the same remedies in
arbitration and litigation).
42. See Green Tree Fin. Corp.-Ala. v. Randolph, 531 U.S. 79, 90 (2000)
(recognizing that large arbitration costs may preclude a litigant with limited financial
means from effectively vindicating her federal statutory rights); see also Italian Colors
III, 667 F.3d 204, 212 (2d Cir.) (noting that prohibitive costs exist when the cost of
pursuing arbitration would dwarf any potential recovery), reh’g en banc denied, 681
F.3d 139 (2d Cir.), cert. granted sub nom. Am. Express Co. v. Italian Colors Rest., 133
S. Ct. 594 (2012).
43. See 531 U.S. at 79 (claiming petitioners violated the Truth in Lending Act by
failing to disclose an insurance requirement and the Equal Credit Opportunity Act by
requiring her to arbitrate her statutory claims).
44. See id. (positing that an agreement silent as to arbitration costs created a risk
she would bear prohibitive costs).
45. See id. at 90-92 (finding the arbitration agreement was enforceable because the
plaintiff did not develop any evidentiary record attesting to the likelihood she would
incur prohibitive costs).
46. See id. at 90 (indicating that prohibitive costs is a relevant inquiry in
determining whether a plaintiff can effectively vindicate her federal statutory rights).
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Tree is the vindication of rights doctrine, which states that an arbitration
agreement is enforceable so long as a plaintiff can effectively vindicate her
rights in arbitration.47 A plaintiff can effectively vindicate her rights when
the substantive rights under the statute are still in place and prohibitive
costs will not preclude the plaintiff from bringing a claim in arbitration.48
The Supreme Court has tended to disfavor class actions in the arbitration
context because it changes the nature of arbitration and arguably
compromises some of its benefits.49 In Stolt-Nielsen, the Court determined
that an arbitrator could not permit a group of plaintiffs to proceed as a class
unless there was a contractual basis for concluding that the parties agreed
to do so.50 If the arbitration agreement is silent as to whether it permits
class arbitration, courts now must assume the lack of consent is an implicit
prohibition on collective proceedings.51 The holding in Stolt-Nielsen that
class arbitration is only permitted when it is expressly provided for is a
foreshadowing of the Court’s ultimate determination in AT&T Mobility
LLC v. Concepcion that aggregated proceedings are inconsistent with
arbitration.52
C. AT&T Mobility LLC v. Concepcion
The Supreme Court held in AT&T Mobility LLC v. Concepcion that the
FAA preempted a state law prohibiting class action waivers in small-dollar
claims because class arbitration interferes with the benefits of arbitration.
The Concepcions filed a class action against AT&T for false advertising
47. See Italian Colors III, 667 F.3d at 216 (holding that Mitsubishi Motors and
Green Tree require courts to find arbitration agreements unenforceable when the
plaintiffs can demonstrate that arbitration is so prohibitively expensive that they cannot
vindicate their rights).
48. See Green Tree, 531 U.S. at 90 (holding that prohibitive costs for the plaintiff
could provide grounds for finding an arbitration agreement unenforceable); Mitsubishi
Motors Corp. v. Soler Chrysler-Plymouth, Inc., 473 U.S. 614, 636-37 (1975) (finding
that a plaintiff cannot effectively vindicate her rights in arbitration if the substantive
rights afforded by the applicable federal statute are compromised).
49. See Stolt-Nielsen S.A. v. AnimalFeeds Int’l Corp., 130 S. Ct. 1759, 1775-76
(2010) (opining that bilateral arbitration is fundamentally different from class
arbitration in its informality, simplicity, and expediency).
50. See id. at 1775 (holding that a party may not be compelled to submit to class
arbitration absent clear assent to do so because it changes the nature of the agreement
to such a degree that an arbitrator cannot assume the parties consented to it).
51. See id. (holding that even though an arbitrator may presume parties implicitly
authorized some procedures, an implicit agreement to authorize class arbitration is no
such procedure because of the differences between class and bilateral arbitration).
52. See AT&T Mobility LLC v. Concepcion, 131 S. Ct. 1740, 1750 (2011) (noting
that Stolt-Nielsen portrayed the character of class arbitration as ‘fundamentally’
different from bilateral arbitration (quoting Stolt-Nielsen, 130 S. Ct. at 1776)).
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and fraud under California’s Discover Bank rule, which states that class
action waivers are unenforceable in adhesion contracts when small
damages are at stake and the drafter attempts to cheat large numbers of
consumers out of individually small amounts of money.53 Pursuant to their
wireless service agreement containing an arbitration clause and a class
action waiver, AT&T moved to compel arbitration.54 The district court and
the Ninth Circuit concluded that the prohibition of class actions was
unconscionable, despite finding the agreement was largely consumer
friendly and would likely make the plaintiffs whole, even in bilateral
arbitration.55 Notably, the Ninth Circuit determined that the FAA did not
preempt, and was consistent with, the Discover Bank rule, considering the
rule an unconscionability principle that applied to contracts generally and
placed arbitration agreements on equal footing.56
Although the Discover Bank rule nominally applied to all contracts, the
Supreme Court found that the state law rule would have a disproportionate
impact on arbitration agreements, thereby interfering with Congress’s
objective in enacting the FAA.57 This disproportionate impact arises out of
the Court’s perception that class action waivers affect agreements to
arbitrate more often than other contracts, likening the waivers to a waiver
of judicially monitored discovery or the Federal Rules of Evidence.58
According to the Court, requiring the availability of class wide arbitration
interferes with the “fundamental attributes” of arbitration—its simplicity
and expediency—by involving more procedures and slowing down the
process.59 Because class arbitration enlarges the potential number of
53. See id. at 1744 (believing AT&T engaged in false advertising and fraud by
charging sales tax on a cell phone advertised as free).
54. See id. (citing the arbitration clause which mandated plaintiffs to bring claims
individually, not as a class member, in any purported class or representative
proceeding).
55. See id. at 1744-6 (agreeing with the Concepcions that because the provision
was unconscionable under Discover Bank, finding the arbitration agreement
unenforceable fell under the FAA savings clause).
56. See id. at 1745-47 (finding a waiver of class actions in litigation
unconscionable under Discover Bank).
57. See id. at 1747-48 (finding the overarching purpose of the FAA was to facilitate
streamlined proceedings, and that class arbitrations do not comport with this purpose).
58. See id. at 1748, 1750 (concluding that most consumer contracts in today’s
world are contracts of adhesion containing class action waivers). But see Brief for
Respondent at 32-33, Concepcion, 131 S. Ct. 1740 (No. 09-893) (distinguishing
waivers to discovery or the Federal Rules of Evidence from class action waivers
because the former are inherently associated with litigation while the latter is
compatible with both litigation and arbitration).
59. See Concepcion, 131 S. Ct. at 1750-51 (opining that class arbitration slows
down the proceeding because additional procedures accompany the consideration of
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plaintiffs, and thus the amount of potential damages, businesses may have
less incentive to resort to arbitration, especially where a court would only
overturn a judgment upon a showing of corruption or partiality by the
arbitrator.60 Moreover, requiring the availability of class arbitration
generally says nothing about the particular plaintiffs’ ability to arbitrate
bilaterally.61 Pursuant to AT&T’s agreement that provided enough
consumer-friendly provisions to incentivize plaintiffs to proceed
individually, the Concepcions did not need to aggregate their claims to be
made whole.62 Because of AT&T’s contract provisions requiring a seven
thousand five hundred dollar premium and double attorney’s fees, the
Concepcions were essentially guaranteed at least a full recovery.63 The
Court repeatedly noted the Concepcions could have received even excess
compensation in bilateral arbitration because of the provisions in AT&T’s
arbitration agreement.64
Therefore, class arbitration was not only
inconsistent with arbitration’s fundamental attributes but was also
unnecessary in the case at bar.65 Notably, the Court recognized that a class
action waiver could keep “small-dollar” claimants from seeking to resolve
their disputes, but that possibility did not disturb its holding.66 Because a
rule requiring the availability of class proceedings in certain scenarios may
make arbitration less attractive, the FAA preempted the Discover Bank

absent parties).
60. See id. at 1750-52 (suggesting that because class arbitration poses higher
transaction costs to defendants who will be less likely to resort to the arbitral forum, the
Discover Bank rule has the effect of displacing arbitration agreements).
61. See id. at 1753 (rejecting the dissent’s contention that class proceedings would
be necessary to protect small-dollar claims because the Concepcions’ claim was likely
to be resolved).
62. See id. (providing further that AT&T was responsible for the costs of all
meritorious claims, the customer must arbitrate close to home, and for some claims, the
customer could opt for arbitration over the phone or purely by papers).
63. See id. at 1753 (indicating that plaintiffs with meritorious claims would have an
incentive to bring their small-dollar claims because they would actually realize a
sufficient recovery).
64. See Transcript of Oral Argument at 29-32, Concepcion, 131 S. Ct. 1740 (No.
09-893) (opining that the Court should only be concerned with the instant parties and
not the arbitration agreement’s effect on third parties); see also Concepcion, 131 S. Ct.
at 1753 (finding the arbitration agreement at issue cognizable under the savings clause
of the FAA because the Concepcions did not need to proceed as a class in order to
resolve their claim with AT&T).
65. See Concepcion, 131 S. Ct. at 1753 (indicating that the class action mechanism
cannot to be preserved in any instance that interferes with the FAA’s objectives).
66. See id. (considering the possibility that small-dollar claims could fall through
the cracks in our legal system “desirable for unrelated reasons”).
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rule.67
D. Italian Colors
1. The Second Circuit Held That the Vindication of Rights Doctrine
Warranted Invalidating the Arbitration Agreement.
The Second Circuit in Italian Colors held that the arbitration agreement
between American Express and the plaintiff merchants was unenforceable,
despite the holding in Concepcion, because arbitration was so costprohibitive that plaintiffs could not vindicate their federal statutory rights.68
Under the provisions of the arbitration agreement, each merchant that
wanted to bring a claim would have to pay all of the costs of arbitration on
her own, including expert and attorney’s fees.69 According to an expert
economist, Italian Colors would likely incur hundreds of thousands of
dollars in expert fees to prove its antitrust claims, and receive less than six
thousand dollars in damages.70 Relying on the expert economist’s study,
plaintiff merchants claimed that enforcing the class action waiver, in
addition to the agreement’s prohibition on cost sharing or cost shifting,
would preclude them from vindicating their rights because bilateral
arbitration would be prohibitively expensive.71
The Second Circuit held that the arbitration agreement was
unenforceable and that Concepcion did not directly apply to the question
presented.72 Applying the vindication of rights doctrine, the Second Circuit
held that if a plaintiff could not feasibly pursue a claim individually and
67. See id. at 1751-52 (claiming that arbitration is poorly suited to the higher stakes
of class litigation and doubting that Congress intended to allow an arbitrator to handle
those kinds of claims).
68. See Italian Colors III, 667 F.3d 204, 214 (2d Cir.) (holding that Concepcion did
not require the Second Circuit to uphold an arbitration agreement if the plaintiffs could
demonstrate that they could not feasibly vindicate their federal statutory rights), reh’g
en banc denied, 681 F.3d 139 (2d Cir.), cert. granted sub nom. Am. Express Co. v.
Italian Colors Rest., 133 S. Ct. 594 (2012), overruled by 133 S. Ct. 2304 (2013).
69. See id. at 209-11 (finding in the arbitration clause a provision that prohibits
merchants from acting in any sort of representative capacity or spreading out fees
amongst other plaintiffs).
70. See id. at 218 (citing an economic study finding the costs of the plaintiffs’ case
could exceed one million dollars, where the average merchant could expect only $5252
in trebled damages).
71. See id. (citing the economist’s affidavit stating it would be economically
irrational to pursue a claim individually when the expected damages would only pay a
small fraction of the expert fees necessary to make a plaintiff’s case).
72. See id. at 206, 219 (holding that when a plaintiff can sufficiently demonstrate
that pursuing arbitration individually would be prohibitively expensive, an arbitration
agreement containing a class action waiver is unenforceable).
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was barred from collective action, valid grounds existed for revocation of
the class action waiver under the FAA.73 Recognizing that the burden lies
on the party seeking to avoid arbitration to prove the likelihood of incurring
prohibitive costs, the court held that the plaintiffs had sufficiently met their
burden.74 In other words, the court applied the vindication of rights
doctrine to hold that a class action waiver can make arbitration
prohibitively expensive when the plaintiff can show the costs of arbitrating
individually would dwarf its recovery.75
According to the Second Circuit, Concepcion only analyzed when state
contract law is preempted by the FAA, while its holding concerned whether
a litigant could effectively vindicate a federal statutory right in
arbitration.76 In particular, the Second Circuit found that the federal
antitrust statutory scheme explicitly intended to encourage private
enforcement by awarding treble damages and reasonable attorney’s fees
and costs under the Clayton Act.77 The court also found that the feeshifting provisions awarded under the Clayton Act would be insufficient to
fully compensate the plaintiffs.78 Because most attorneys counsel plaintiffs
on a contingency-fee basis, no competent attorney would take on such a
complex antitrust case when she could not expect to make a profit even if
she wins the case.79 Removing the plaintiffs’ only reasonable means of
73. See id. at 210 (finding Green Tree controlling to the extent it holds an
arbitration agreement is unenforceable if a plaintiff demonstrates arbitration would be
prohibitively expensive).
74. See id. at 210-12 (finding the economist’s affidavit credible in establishing that
American Express’s agreement ensures no merchant will seek to vindicate its rights by
removing the plaintiffs’ only reasonably feasible means of recovery).
75. See id. at 219 (emphasizing that it was not holding that class action waivers in
arbitration agreements are per se unenforceable, but rather that each waiver should be
analyzed by its effect on the particular parties’ ability to arbitrate).
76. See id. at 213-14, 219 (recognizing that Concepcion and Stolt-Nielsen
prohibited courts from requiring parties to submit to class arbitration absent an express
agreement to do so, but noting that its holding would make no such requirement).
77. See In re Am. Express Merch. Litig. (Italian Colors I), 554 F.3d 300, 317-18
(2d Cir. 2009) (rejecting the defendant’s argument that the Clayton Act would provide
the plaintiffs with sufficient financial incentives to arbitrate individually because even
those provisions were inadequate to fully recoup their expenses), vacated, 130 S. Ct.
2401 (2010), aff’d, 634 F.3d 187 (2d Cir. 2011), aff’d on reh’g, 667 F.3d 204 (2d Cir.),
reh’g en banc denied, 681 F.3d 139 (2d Cir.), cert. granted sub nom. Am. Express Co.
v. Italian Colors Rest., 133 S. Ct. 594 (2012), overruled by 133 S. Ct. 2304 (2013).
78. See Italian Colors III, 667 F.3d at 218 (finding insufficiencies because the
trebling of small individual damages would not cover the expert fees, and the plaintiffs
must factor in the risk of losing and recovering no fees at all).
79. See Kristian v. Comcast Corp., 446 F. 3d 25, 58-59 (1st Cir. 2006) (noting that
plaintiffs’ attorney in antitrust suits make huge upfront expenditures and factor in the
uncertainty of success).
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recovery was troubling to the court due to the effect it would have on the
role of private citizens in supplementing the government’s efforts to
enforce the antitrust laws.80 Further, Green Tree does not limit the forms
of prohibitive costs to those unique to arbitration, such as the filing fee and
the cost for the arbitrator, and other circuits have concluded that the
relevant inquiry is how expensive arbitration would be in toto from the
claimant’s point of view.81
2. The Supreme Court Held That the Vindication of Rights Doctrine, If It
Indeed Exists, Does Not Apply to Arbitration Agreements That Do Not
Implicate the “Right to Pursue” a Claim Under Federal Law.
On June 20, 2013, the Supreme Court, in a 5-3 decision,82 reversed the
Second Circuit and held that American Express’s arbitration agreement was
enforceable.83 The Court reasoned that the FAA requires courts to
“rigorously enforce” arbitration agreements, even when a violation of a
federal statute is at issue, “unless the FAA’s mandate has been overridden
by a contrary congressional command.”84 Focusing on the plaintiffs’
complaint that the arbitration agreement included a class action waiver, the
Court determined that neither the antitrust laws nor congressional approval
of Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 23 was such a “congressional
command.” First, the antitrust laws themselves say nothing about class
actions and those laws were enacted before class actions were fully
contemplated.85 Neither, the Court reasoned, does congressional approval

80. See Italian Colors I, 554 F.3d at 312-13 (indicating that class actions may be
the only effective mechanism for private parties bringing antitrust actions to effectively
vindicate their rights).
81. See Bradford v. Rockwell Semiconductor Sys., Inc., 238 F.3d 549, 556 (4th
Cir. 2001) (believing “the proper inquiry under Gilmer is not where the money goes but
rather the amount of money that ultimately will be paid” because plaintiffs would be
deterred from pursuing their statutory rights no matter who receives their funds).
82. The majority opinion, authored by Justice Scalia, was joined by Chief Justice
Roberts and Justices Alito, Kennedy, and Thomas. Justice Kagan, joined by Justices
Breyer and Ginsburg, dissented. Justice Sotomayor, who was on the panel in the first
decision in the Second Circuit, was recused.
83. Am. Express Co. v. Italian Colors Rest., 133 S. Ct. 2304, 2312 (2013)
(concluding that the FAA did not permit a court, before requiring the parties to
arbitrate, to make a determination on a case-by-case basis that the plaintiffs could costeffectively produce the evidence necessary to succeed on the merits of their underlying
claim).
84. See id. at 2309 (quoting CompuCredit Corp. v. Greenwood, 132 S. Ct 665, 669
(2012) (emphasizing the FAA’s mandate that courts require parties to submit to
arbitration with whom the parties agreed to arbitrate and under the terms to which the
parties assented) (internal quotation marks omitted).
85. See id. at 2309-10 (noting that Rule 23, which provides for class certification if
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of class certification in certain circumstances amount to an entitlement to
such proceedings when federal statutory rights are at issue.86
The Court concluded that the language in Mitsubishi Motors invoked by
the Second Circuit in favor of recognizing the vindication of rights doctrine
is purely dicta, because the Mitsubishi Motors Court declined to invalidate
the arbitration agreement at issue.87 Additionally, the Court emphasized
that the concern espoused by Mitsubishi Motors was a plaintiff’s “right to
pursue” statutory remedies.88 According to the Court, a plaintiff’s “right to
pursue” a federal statutory claim is only abridged if the agreement on its
face bars the claim. In other words, the cost of proving a federal statutory
claim is a consideration apart from a plaintiff’s right to pursue that claim,
and only the latter can affect the enforceability of an arbitration
agreement.89 As such, because a class action waiver still, on its face,
preserves a party’s right to bring a claim individually in arbitration, there is
no need under Mitsubishi Motors or the FAA to invalidate an arbitration
agreement on that basis.90 While the Court conceded that an agreement in
which the drafter imposed extremely high administrative fees could affect a
party’s right to pursue a statutory claim, the Court concluded that a claim
that would be expensive to prove did not, in and of itself, interfere with that
right.91
The Court also broadened the holding in Concepcion. Rather than
confining the holding to preemption and the Discover Bank rule’s

certain qualifications are met, was enacted much later than the Sherman and Clayton
Acts).
86. See id. at 2310 (pointing out that it is difficult for plaintiffs to meet all of the
requirements of Rule 23, so much so that most cases do not get past the class
certification stage).
87. See id. at 2310 & n.2 (noting that the Court in Mitsubishi Motors rejected the
contention that arbitration in that case was inadequate and that the Second Circuit also
addressed the same language as dicta).
88. See id. at 2310-11 (citing Mitsubishi Motors, 437 U.S. 614, 637 n.9 (1985))
(positing that the “right to pursue statutory remedies” would be affected by a provision
that explicitly precluded a party from bringing a certain claim, or possibly an
agreement that imposed high administrative fees, but not the kind of claim brought by
the merchants).
89. See id. (positing that an agreement explicitly barring Sherman Act claims, or
imposing extremely high administrative fees, would on its face be exculpatory and
would not be permissible).
90. See id. at 2311 (opining that the “right to pursue” a statutory remedy is not
impinged simply because it is not economically worthwhile to expend the money
necessary to prove that claim).
91. See id. (asserting that a class action waiver only prevents multiple plaintiffs
from asserting a claim against a defendant but does not prevent any one plaintiff from
bringing that claim).
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impermissible categorical ban on class action waivers, the Court opined
that Concepcion “established . . . that the FAA’s command to enforce
arbitration agreements trumps any interest in ensuring the prosecution of
low-value claims.”92 Because the Second Circuit in Italian Colors
similarly sought to preserve small-dollar claims through invalidating
arbitration agreements, the Court reasoned that the merchants’ claim must
fail.93 Moreover, the Court concluded that the case-by-case test established
by the Second Circuit would impose significant procedural barriers before
parties could proceed with arbitration, which in turn would interfere with
the purpose of the FAA—to promote streamlined resolution of disputes in
arbitration.94
3. The Dissent Argued That the Vindication of Rights Doctrine Should
Apply to an Arbitration Agreement That “Effectively” Interferes With a
Claimant’s Ability to Bring a Claim in Arbitration.
The dissent asserted that the vindication of rights doctrine requires
invalidation of an arbitration agreement “when (but only when) it operates
to confer immunity from potentially meritorious claims.”95 The arbitration
agreement crafted by American Express, the dissent argued, has the same
effect as an arbitration agreement that is exculpatory on its face—the
agreement might as well have stated that “Merchants may bring no
Sherman Act claims.”96 The latter clause unquestionably would be
unenforceable as a clear waiver of the right to bring those claims.97 The
dissent reasoned that the vindication of rights doctrine should not be
limited to provisions that are so “baldly exculpatory,” because drafters
could get around it by crafting clauses that merely have the same effect.98
92. See id. at 2312 & n.5 (stating that the interest in ensuring the viability of smalldollar claims is unaffected by the FAA’s mandate to enforce arbitration agreements).
93. See id. (asserting that the interest in preserving small-dollar claims in
arbitration was “unrelated” the principles arising out of the FAA).
94. See id. at 2312 (opining that the imposition of such procedures would
“undoubtedly destroy the prospect of speedy resolution” that was the purpose of the
FAA’s mandate to favor enforcement of arbitration agreements).
95. See id. at 2313 (Kagan, J., dissenting) (asserting that the vindication of rights
doctrine harmonizes the FAA’s principles with other federal statutes).
96. See id. at 2313-14 (opining that the latter clause would be unenforceable, even
in an arbitration agreement, for interfering with Congress’s clear intention to encourage
private citizens to bring antitrust claims).
97. See id. (noting that a prospective waiver of the right to bring an antitrust
agreement is unenforceable in any kind of contract, including an arbitration
agreement).
98. See id. at 2314 (illustrating that setting filing fees at extremely high levels,
requiring a statute of limitations of one day, or limiting the remedies an arbitrator may
award would have the same effect as a clause that explicitly barred a federal statutory
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Prohibiting any claimant from introducing economic studies or testimony,
for example, has the same effect as a clause that plainly bars Sherman Act
claims because no plaintiff can successfully bring an antitrust claim
without such evidence.99 The dissent argued that the vindication of rights
doctrine has to cover both scenarios if it is to have any effect at all, and if it
is going to comply with the Court’s precedent.100 Indeed, the Court has
held that claims are only arbitrable “so long as the prospective litigant
effectively may vindicate its statutory cause of action in the arbitral
forum.”101
The dissent pointed out that the vindication of rights doctrine “furthers
the purposes not just of laws like the Sherman Act, but of the FAA itself”
because the policy behind the FAA is to promote the efficient resolution of
claims, not to prevent potentially meritorious low-dollar claims from
coming to fruition.102 By declining to recognize the doctrine for the kind of
claim brought by Italian Colors, the dissent argued that the Court is
sanctioning companies to draft arbitration agreements that make it
impossible to resolve a dispute.103 In enacting Section Two of the FAA,
Congress envisioned a process in which more arbitration takes place and
claimants may effectively enforce federal and state law, not a process in
which plaintiffs are, for all intents and purposes, precluded from doing
so.104 Furthermore, because the bar is high for the kinds of claims that
would fall under the rule—those in which the claimant would face
prohibitive costs or some other impenetrable barrier to arbitration—and the
claim).
99. See id. (positing that a provision preventing a party from gathering the evidence
necessary to successfully bring a claim should similarly be unenforceable because it
would permit a company like American Express to use its market power to perpetuate
its monopoly).
100. See id. (arguing that the Court reached the wrong result because the Court’s
precedent establishes that an arbitration agreement is unenforceable if the agreement
effectively precludes prospective litigants from vindicating their federal statutory rights
in arbitration).
101. Accord Mitsubishi Motors Corp. v. Soler Chrysler-Plymouth, 437 U.S. 614,
637 (1985) (calling upon courts to invalidate arbitration agreements if they require
parties to effectively waive their rights to bring federal statutory claims).
102. See Italian Colors, 133 S. Ct. at 2315 (Kagan, J., dissenting) (noting that the
FAA sought to promote efficient resolution of claims, not to devise a way for parties to
attain de facto liability for their violations of the law).
103. See id. (asserting that drafters could devise countless ways to prevent parties
from bringing claims in arbitration without running afoul of Mitsubishi Motors under
the Court’s reasoning).
104. See id. (determining that the purposes of the FAA would be compromised by
permitting drafters to get around arbitration because the FAA mandates courts to
promote such procedures).
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claimant’s case must be grounded in “concrete proof,” the vindication of
rights doctrine would only invalidate a small number of agreements and
therefore would not interfere with the efficient resolution of most claims in
arbitration.105
Contrary to the majority’s assertion, the dissent argued that the language
in Mitsubishi Motors was not dictum: the Court there held that claims are
arbitrable “so long as the plaintiffs could effectively vindicate their
rights.”106 The Court in Green Tree, moreover, applied that rule to
emphasize that prohibitive costs could prevent plaintiffs from effectively
vindicating their rights.107 The majority’s contention that the rule only
covers agreements that prevent the “right to pursue statutory remedies,” the
dissent contended, ignores the principle espoused by Mitsubushi Motors
and Green Tree; “[w]hen an arbitration agreement prevents the effective
vindication of statutory rights, a party may go to court.”108 This principle
would indeed cover the agreements the majority accepts, but it would also
cover an agreement that is not exculpatory on its face but has the same
effect.109 The dissent disagreed with the majority’s contention that Green
Tree limited the relevant “prohibitive costs” to filing fees or the arbitrator’s
compensation, and therefore its holding could apply to any arbitration
agreement that would make pursuing a claim prohibitively expensive,
however that may be.110
Applying the vindication of rights doctrine to the case at hand, the

105. See id. at 2315-16 (noting that the Court has placed significant limits on the
kinds of claims that warrant invalidating an arbitration agreement under the vindication
of rights doctrine though evidentiary burdens and a narrow focus).
106. See id. at 2317 n.3 (Kagan, J., dissenting) (arguing that the Mitsubishi Motors
Court only declined to decide whether the particular arbitration agreement “in fact”
effectively preluded the claimant from vindicating its federal statutory rights, but
explicitly stated that if it did have that effect, the Court would condemn it).
107. See id. at 2315-16 (noting that the Court in Green Tree expounded on the
principle in Mitsubishi Motors and applied it to the situation in which a claimant would
realize prohibitive costs in arbitration).
108. See id. at 2317 (arguing that the distinction drawn by the Court to deny the
merchants the benefit of the vindication of rights doctrine was improper in light of the
principle arising out of Mitsubishi Motors and Green Tree).
109. See id. at 2317-18 (citing Mitsubishi Motors, 437 U.S. 614, 637 n.19 (1985))
(maintaining that agreements that merely have an exculpatory effect should be
condemned because they still “operate . . . as a prospective waiver of a party’s [federal
right[s]”) (alteration in original).
110. See id. at 2318 (“[Green Tree] gave no hint of distinguishing among the
different ways an arbitration agreement can make a claim too costly to bring. Its
rationale applies whenever an agreement makes the vindication of federal claims
impossibly expensive—whether by imposing fees or proscribing cost-sharing or
adopting some other device.”)
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dissent argued that the agreement should have been invalidated because
Italian Colors presented solid evidence that the arbitration agreement acted
as a “prospective waiver” of the ability to bring an antitrust claim.111 The
plaintiffs proffered an expert economist affidavit submitting that they
would have to pay anywhere from several hundred thousand dollars to one
million dollars for an expert market study, and would only receive one
tenth of that amount in damages.112 This affidavit, combined with
American Express’s prohibition on class actions, joinder, or any kind of
information sharing that could facilitate cost sharing among merchants,
fulfilled both the “prohibitive cost” requirement and the “concrete proof
requirement.”113
The dissent also argued that the majority’s perception of the merchants’
claims was unduly limited.114 The merchants indeed contested the class
action waiver, but only because the cumulative effect of the waiver and the
other provisions in the agreement that precluded any cost sharing or cost
shifting made individual arbitration economically impracticable.115 An
agreement that included a class action waiver but provided for cost shifting
to the successful party, for example, might still provide an avenue for
effective vindication of federal statutory rights.116 The Second Circuit
stated that a class action was the “only economically feasible means” for
Italian Colors to pursue a claim after determining that the agreement also
foreclosed all other avenues that would reduce an individual merchant’s
costs.117 Italian Colors only sought to confirm that an arbitration agreement

111. See id. at 2316 (noting that it would be economically irrational for a merchant
to attempt to pursue an antitrust claim individually against American Express because
the cost of the necessary expert study would be ten times the potential recovery).
112. See id. (arguing that this assertion constituted a legitimate “prohibitive costs”
argument that should have been undertaken by the majority).
113. See id. (arguing that, based on the facts in the record, the merchants could not
succeed in proving their antitrust claim in arbitration without proffering the expensive
economic study, and therefore American Express’s arbitration agreement should have
been invalidated because it foreclosed any possible way for the merchants to present
that study).
114. See id. at 2318 (maintaining that the Court improperly viewed the merchants’
claim as solely about class actions because the merchants challenged the effect of the
entire agreement as a whole).
115. See id. (illustrating that a class action waiver could be legitimate if it were
coupled with another provision that facilitated some form of cost sharing or cost
shifting, thereby enabling the merchants to feasibly pursue an antitrust claim in
arbitration).
116. Id.
117. See id. at 2318-19 (noting that the Second Circuit considered whether
American Express would assume the merchants’ costs if the merchants were successful
in arbitration or would permit the merchants to share information so that they could
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would be invalidated if the plaintiffs could sufficiently demonstrate that the
agreement effectively was so prohibitively expensive that the plaintiffs
were effectively barred from arbitrating their disputes.118
Finally, the dissent posited that Concepcion was not relevant to the
disposition of this case.119 The plaintiffs in Concepcion were solely
challenging a class action waiver even though the parties could vindicate
their rights without it, whereas the merchants here challenged the
arbitration agreement as a whole because it impaired the merchants’ ability
to vindicate their rights.120 The dissent asserted that Concepcion could not
control this case because the Discover Bank rule in Concepcion was
dismissed on preemption grounds, but the Court could not use those same
grounds when a federal law was at issue.121 As such, the Court did not
address the vindication of rights doctrine in Concepcion, nor could it,
because the case did not concern federal law.122 The dissent pointed out
that Concepcion made no mention of Mitsubishi Motors or Green Tree, and
the parties conceded that the Concepcions were likely to be made whole
even in bilateral arbitration.123 Because the vindication of rights doctrine
applied to the merchants’ claims and was supported by the Court’s
precedents, three justices on the Court dissented.
III. ANALYSIS
A. American Express’s Arbitration Agreement Should Have Been
Invalidated Because the Agreement Prevented the Plaintiffs From
Vindicating Their Rights, Thereby Falling Directly Under the Savings
share an expert market study).
118. Accord Italian Colors III, 667 F.3d 204, 210-11 (2d Cir. 2012), overruled by
133 S. Ct. 2304 (2013) (asserting that the plaintiffs met their burden of demonstrating
that they would incur costs that were prohibitive if they were forced to proceed with
individual arbitration).
119. See Italian Colors, 133 S. Ct. at 2319-20 (Kagan, J., dissenting) (reiterating that
because Italian Colors did not solely challenge the class action waiver, Concepcion
cannot directly control the merchants’ claims).
120. See id. at 2320 (positing that the only way the Court can assert Concepcion’s
relevance is through its “false pretense” that the merchants were requiring the Court to
solely consider and invalidate the class action waiver).
121. See id. (noting that Concepcion could not have implicated the vindication of
rights doctrine because the doctrine only applies to cases of two competing federal
statutes, not when a state law allegedly frustrates the FAA).
122. See id. (stating that, contrary to the federal antitrust laws, the Court is not
concerned in vindicating a state law that conflicts with a federal law).
123. See id. (asserting that Concepcion cannot be directly on point when the Court
did not cite the most relevant precedents establishing and applying the vindication of
rights doctrine).

Published by Digital Commons @ American University Washington College of Law, 2013

21

Journal of Gender, Social Policy & the Law, Vol. 21, Iss. 4 [2013], Art. 7

972

JOURNAL OF GENDER, SOCIAL POLICY & THE LAW

[Vol. 21:4

Clause of the FAA.
1. The Vindication of Rights Test as Established in Italian Colors Is a
Defense That Falls Under the Savings Clause of the FAA.
The vindication of rights doctrine as to the claims brought by the
merchants in Italian Colors falls squarely within the savings clause of
Section Two of the FAA.124 Under Section Two, arbitration agreements
can be revoked “upon such grounds as exist at law or in equity for the
revocation of any contract.”125 This places the burden on the court to
determine whether a particular defense offered by a plaintiff to avoid
arbitration would be recognized under state contract law.126 Any kind of
contract that acts as a prospective waiver of a defendant’s liability could
not be enforced under state or federal law because it is unconscionable.127
The vindication of rights doctrine is analogous to this general
unconscionability principle, which is a valid defense under Section Two so
long as it does not arise specifically because an agreement to arbitrate is at
issue.128
Under the Second Circuit’s reasoning, a contract is unenforceable if it
effectively prevents the plaintiff from bringing a claim in any forum, not
just the arbitral forum, and the court found enforcement of the arbitration
agreement here would give the merchants no forum to enforce their
rights.129 In other words, the rule applied by the Second Circuit focuses on

124. See Italian Colors III, 667 F.3d at 219 (acknowledging the FAA embodies a
strong policy favoring arbitration but holding a class action waiver that precludes
effective vindication of statutory rights is unenforceable).
125. See, e.g., Perry v. Thomas, 482 U.S. 483, 492-93 n.9 (1987) (noting that
traditional contract defenses can revoke an arbitration agreement so long as they do not
arise specifically because an agreement to arbitrate is at issue).
126. See Doctor’s Assoc., Inc. v. Casarotto, 517 U.S. 681, 687 (1996) (recognizing
that courts may interpret arbitration agreements and invalidate them for contract
defenses such as fraud, duress, or unconscionability under the FAA savings clause).
127. Compare Am. Online, Inc. v. Superior Court, 90 Cal. App. 4th 1, 17-18 (2001)
(finding a waiver of class actions in litigation unconscionable under Discover Bank
because it was exculpatory), with Kristian v. Comcast Corp., 446 F.3d 25, 47-48, 52-53
(1st Cir. 2006) (finding an arbitration clause prohibiting treble damages, attorney fees,
and class actions was unenforceable because it prevented the vindication of federal
statutory rights).
128. See AT&T Mobility LLC v. Concepcion, 131 S. Ct. 1740, 1748 (2011) (noting
that the savings clause could not be construed to uphold state law that impedes the
FAA’s objectives).
129. See Italian Colors III, 667 F.3d 204, 211 (2d Cir.) (noting that enforcing the
class action waiver in this case would eradicate the only viable avenue for plaintiffs to
vindicate their rights, thus granting American Express “de facto immunity” for their
wrongdoing (quoting Italian Colors I, 554 F.3d 300, 320 (2d Cir. 2009)), reh’g en banc
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the end result, not the means through which a particular plaintiff may
pursue a claim.130 The rule favors the arbitration agreement only to the
extent that arbitration merely represents a change in forum and does not
compromise the fundamental rights or remedies available under the
applicable federal statute, such as the Sherman and Clayton Acts.131 If a
contract generally could not lawfully invoke a class action waiver that
would effectively prevent a plaintiff from bringing a claim, a court could
not uphold such a de facto waiver of liability just because it arises in an
arbitration agreement.132
The plaintiffs in Italian Colors did not proffer a defense that arises
specifically because an agreement to arbitrate is at issue, nor did they truly
contest arbitration at all.133 Rather, the cumulative effect of the provisions
in the arbitration agreement prevented them from bringing their antitrust
claims in any forum, not just the arbitral forum.134 This is the exact sort of
contractual agreement Congress intended to prohibit in enacting the savings
clause of the FAA, and it falls squarely under the plain meaning of that
clause.135 By commanding that arbitration agreements be held
unenforceable for the same defenses that would render any contract
unenforceable, Congress intended to ensure that a defendant could not
escape liability merely by inserting an exculpatory clause in an arbitration

denied, 681 F.3d 139 (2d Cir.), cert. granted sub nom. Am. Express Co. v. Italian
Colors Rest., 133 S. Ct. 594 (2012), overruled by 133 S. Ct. 2304 (2013).
130. See id. at 219 (stating that its holding does not render all class action waivers in
antitrust actions unenforceable and requires each waiver to be analyzed on a case-bycase basis).
131. See Gilmer v. Interstate/Johnson Lane Corp., 500 U.S. 20, 32 (1991)
(emphasizing that arbitration of statutory claims works because it typically provides
another forum for plaintiffs to resolve their statutory claims).
132. See Italian Colors III, 667 F.3d at 211 (finding that the class action waiver
could not be enforced because it would grant American Express “de facto immunity
from antitrust liability” (quoting Italian Colors I, 554 F.3d at 320)).
133. See Brief for Plaintiff-Appellant at 28, In re Am. Express Merch. Litig., 2006
WL 6198567 (2d Cir. 2006) (No. 06-1871-cv) (noting that the class action waiver, if
applied in court, would still be subject to revocation).
134. See id. (contending that the provisions in the arbitration agreement effectively
“operate as a prospective waiver” of the merchants’ right to bring antitrust claims
(quoting Mitsubishi Motors Corp. v. Soler Chrysler-Plymouth, Inc., 473 U.S. 614, 637
n.13 (1985))).
135. See Italian Colors III, 667 F.3d at 218 (doubting that Congress intended to
eliminate the express private right of action in our antitrust laws in light of its “strong
private enforcement mechanisms and incentives”); see also Mitsubishi Motors, 473
U.S. at 637 n.19 (acknowledging the Court would readily condemn an agreement under
the FAA that effectively operated as a prospective waiver of a party’s right to pursue
statutory remedies).
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agreement.136 To hold otherwise would be to place agreements to arbitrate
on a higher footing than other contracts, which goes beyond the confines of
the FAA and the Supreme Court’s interpretation of the savings clause.137
2. The Vindication of Rights Doctrine Limits the Application of the FAA
and the Enforcement of Arbitration Agreements by Ensuring the
Substantive Rights Under the Antitrust Laws Remain in Force.
As the Second Circuit noted, Concepcion plainly determined whether a
state contract law was preempted.138 It did not purport to hold as a matter
of law that a court could never invalidate a class action waiver in an
arbitration agreement.139 Because Italian Colors relied on federal antitrust
law rather than state law, Concepcion does not directly control the question
presented.140 Instead, the Court should have reconciled Congress’s
established mandate favoring arbitration without construing that mandate
so broadly as to negate the Sherman and Clayton Acts.141
Thus, even if the vindication of rights doctrine as applied in Italian
Colors does not fall squarely under Section Two, it is still necessary to
ensure that courts are not enforcing arbitration agreements to the detriment
of conflicting federal statutes such as the Sherman and Clayton Acts.142 As
the dissent correctly pointed out, the vindication of rights doctrine “furthers
the purposes not just of laws like the Sherman Act, but of the FAA itself”
because the doctrine ensures that meritorious small-dollar claims are still

136. See Prima Paint Corp. v. Flood & Conklin Mfg. Co., 388 U.S. 395, 404 n.12
(1967) (recognizing that immunizing an arbitration agreement from judicial challenge
despite its unlawful exculpatory effect would be inconsistent with the savings clause).
137. See id. (recognizing that courts may not make arbitration agreements more
enforceable than other contracts).
138. See Italian Colors III, 667 F.3d at 212 (finding that Concepcion does not
directly control the question presented because its holding was grounded in preemption
law).
139. See id. at 214, 216-17 (noting that Stolt-Nielsen and Concepcion do not require
all class action waivers to be per se enforceable and leaving later courts to decide
whether a class action waiver is enforceable when the litigants face prohibitive costs).
140. See id. at 213 (positing that Concepcion merely provided the basis for
determining when state contract law impedes the objectives of the FAA, while its
holding rested on “federal law of arbitrability”).
141. See Int’l Union of Elec. Radio and Mach. Workers, AFL-CIO v. NLRB, 289
F.2d 757, 761 (D.C. Cir. 1960) (discussing that conflicts between two federal statutes
should be resolved in a way that gives effect to the latest statute and still allows the
earlier statute to be operative).
142. See Bilski v. Kappos, 130 S. Ct. 3218, 3228 (2010) (holding that a court should
not interpret a statute in a way that would render enforcement of an earlier statute
impracticable).
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viable while also promoting the efficient resolution of claims.143 The
FAA’s mandate to favor arbitration was intended to encourage parties to
arbitrate, not to encourage drafters to craft agreements that made it
impracticable to ever reach the arbitral forum.144 The vindication of rights
doctrine, therefore, reconciles the FAA’s mandate to enforce the terms of
arbitration agreements with the merchants’ right in Italian Colors to bring
an antitrust claim.145 The vindication of rights doctrine gives effect to both
the FAA and the Sherman Act by enforcing mandatory arbitration
agreements according to their terms, but only to the extent that the
particular claimant can vindicate the particular rights at issue in each
case.146 Enforcing arbitration agreements with the caveat that prospective
litigants may effectively vindicate their rights preserves the substantive
rights afforded by federal statutes and still ensures that arbitration
agreements are generally enforced according to their terms.147 Holding the
merchant agreement enforceable notwithstanding a clear demonstration of
prohibitive costs would undermine the antitrust laws’ encouragement of
private actions because the instant parties would be unable to enforce those
laws.148 To weigh in favor of an arbitration agreement when there is
substantial evidence demonstrating that the merchants could not effectively
vindicate their federal statutory rights would only give effect to the FAA
and, thus, fail to balance the interests of both federal statutes.149

143. See Am. Express Co. v. Italian Colors Rest., 133 S. Ct. 2304, 2315 (2013)
(Kagan, J., dissenting) (pointing out that the FAA envisioned more arbitration and did
not intend to promote exculpatory clauses that inhibit access to arbitration).
144. See id. (“What the FAA prefers to litigation is arbitration, not de facto
immunity.”).
145. See Italian Colors III, 667 F.3d at 213 (holding that an arbitration agreement is
unenforceable only when the provisions effectively “defeat the remedial purpose of the
statute” (quoting Paladino v. Avnet Computer Techs., Inc., 134 F.3d 1054, 1062 (11th
Cir. 1998))).
146. See id. at 216. (citing Shankle v. B-G Maint. Mgmt. of Colo., Inc., 163 F.3d
1230, 1234 (10th Cir. 1999)) (recognizing that the FAA’s policy favoring arbitration,
even when federal statutory claims are at issue, is not without bounds).
147. See generally Myriam Gilles & Gary Friedman, After Class: Aggregate
Litigation in the Wake of AT&T Mobility v. Concepcion, 79 U. CHI. L. REV. 623, 628
(2012) (reasoning that Green Tree provides a compromise between the FAA and
competing statutes by requiring the plaintiff to prove the likelihood of incurring
prohibitive costs).
148. See Mitsubishi Motors Corp. v. Soler Chrysler-Plymouth, Inc., 473 U.S. 614,
637 (1975) (concluding that as long as a potential litigant may effectively vindicate its
statutory claim in arbitration, the statute continues to serve its function).
149. See United States v. Palumbo Bros., Inc., 145 F.3d 850, 865 (7th Cir. 1998)
(concluding that absent a clear expression from Congress that it intended one federal
statute to preempt another, courts must give two federal statutes simultaneous effect).
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Because the government does not have the resources to investigate and
prosecute every antitrust violation, the ability of private citizens to
supplement their efforts is necessary to ensure antitrust laws are adequately
enforced.150 Congress provided for treble damages to successful private
plaintiffs in the antitrust law scheme to encourage private parties to
prosecute antitrust violations.151 Moreover, because it is difficult and
expensive to prove an antitrust claim, class actions may be the only
mechanism for private parties to have both the means and the incentive to
bring a claim.152 Thus, the Court should allow the parties to proceed as a
class if individual arbitration is impracticable.153 This is not to say that the
class action procedure is necessary to bringing an antitrust claim.154 Once a
court recognizes that a plaintiff, encouraged by Congress to bring private
actions, would face such prohibitive costs that it would not be able to bring
a claim individually, that court should allow the claim to proceed as a
class.155 In the case at bar, because the merchants provided an expert
150. See Reiter v. Sonotone Corp., 442 U.S. 330, 344 (1979) (noting that there are
nearly twenty times more private antitrust suits than actions filed by the Department of
Justice).
151. See id. at 343-44 (noting that the provisions of the Clayton Act were meant to
encourage private citizens to enforce antitrust laws and deter future violations).
152. See, e.g., Paschall v. Kansas City Star Co., 695 F.2d 322, 339 (8th Cir. 1982)
(recognizing the large expense of research and expert fees necessary for a plaintiff to
prove an antitrust claim (citing Welsch v. Likins, 68 F.R.D. 589, 596-98 (D. Minn.
1975))).
153. See Deposit Guar. Nat’l Bank v. Roper, 445 U.S. 326, 338 (1980) (recognizing
that class actions may motivate plaintiffs to bring cases that might not be brought
otherwise, thereby vindicating the rights of others who may not find it worthwhile to
bring a claim).
154. See Mitsubishi Motors Corp. v. Soler Chrysler-Plymouth, Inc., 473 U.S. 614,
633-34 (1985) (holding that antitrust actions are not inherently inconsistent with
bilateral arbitration).
155. See Cargill, Inc. v. Monfort of Colo., Inc., 479 U.S. 104, 129 (1986) (Stevens,
J., dissenting) (noting it would be odd for an antitrust statute to define a violation in
such a fashion that no private party could enforce it). This point, of course, is not
without limits. The vindication of rights doctrine does not permit plaintiffs to vindicate
their federal statutory rights no matter what obstacle they face. Plaintiffs could not
invoke the doctrine, for example, if they did not meet Rule 23’s class certification
requirements or if they did not file their claim before the statute of limitations tolled.
The doctrine only states that Congress did not intend for the FAA to prevail when
arbitration agreements no longer represent merely a change in forum, but rather require
parties to waive rights they would otherwise have possessed. See Gilmer v.
Interstate/Johnson Lane Corp., 500 U.S. 20, 32 (1991) (emphasizing that arbitration of
statutory claims works because it typically provides another forum for plaintiffs to
resolve their statutory claims); Mitsubishi Motors, 473 U.S. at 628 (noting that a
plaintiff can effectively vindicate substantive rights afforded by federal statutes as long
as arbitration is merely a change in forum).
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economist’s affidavit proving they could not feasibly bring a claim
individually, the vindication of rights doctrine should be ratified and the
plaintiffs should be able to aggregate their claims.156
B. The Supreme Court Incorrectly Applied the Vindication of Rights
Doctrine as Required By Mitsubishi Motors and Green Tree.
The Second Circuit in Italian Colors applied the vindication of rights
doctrine arising out of Mitsubishi Motors and Green Tree to determine
whether the merchants could effectively vindicate their rights in bilateral
arbitration.157 Under Mitsubishi Motors, the inquiry is whether arbitration
merely provides a different forum or whether the plaintiffs would have to
forgo the substantive rights under the applicable federal statute.158 Under
Green Tree, courts must analyze whether the plaintiff would incur such
prohibitive costs in arbitration that enforcing the arbitration clause would
preclude a plaintiff from bringing a claim in any forum.159 The Supreme
Court in Italian Colors incorrectly applied these precedents by assuming
that an arbitration agreement that was not facially exculpatory would not
interfere with a plaintiff’s ability to vindicate her federal statutory rights in
the arbitral forum.160
1. Under Mitsubishi Motors, the Substantive Rights Afforded by the
Federal Antitrust Laws Would Be Compromised if the Arbitration
Agreement Was Enforced.
Mitsubishi Motors requires arbitration agreements to be enforceable so
long as they do not undermine the relevant statutory scheme.161 Here,
156. See Italian Colors III, 667 F.3d 204, 218 (2d Cir.) (citing Italian Colors I, 554
F.3d 300, 319 (2d Cir. 2009), reh’g en banc denied, 681 F.3d 139 (2d Cir.), cert.
granted sub nom. Am. Express Co. v. Italian Colors Rest., 133 S. Ct. 594 (2012)),
overruled by 133 S. Ct. 2304 (2013) (emphasizing that American Express did not truly
contest that plaintiffs could not feasibly pursue a claim individually in federal court or
in arbitration).
157. See id. at 214-18 (analyzing Mitsubishi Motors and Green Tree to hold that the
vindication of rights doctrine requires American Express’s arbitration agreement to be
held unenforceable).
158. See Mitsubishi Motors, 473 U.S. at 628 (noting that a plaintiff can effectively
vindicate substantive rights afforded by federal statutes as long as arbitration is merely
a change in forum).
159. See Green Tree Fin. Corp.-Ala. v. Randolph, 531 U.S. 79, 90 (2000)
(recognizing that prohibitive arbitration costs could preclude a plaintiff from effectively
vindicating her rights).
160. See Italian Colors III, 667 F.3d at 214-17 (holding that the class action waiver
precluded the merchants’ only reasonably feasible means of recovery, making the
arbitration agreement unenforceable).
161. See Mitsubishi Motors, 473 U.S. at 627 (noting that a party typically does not
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however, enforcement of the arbitration agreement would undermine the
statutory scheme under the Sherman and Clayton Acts by compromising
the merchants’ ability to complement the government’s efforts to enforce
the antitrust laws.162
As Mitsubishi Motors expressed, Congress did not indicate that antitrust
violations should not be subjected to arbitration, nor is there any inherent
conflict.163 By enforcing an agreement that makes arbitration exponentially
more costly than the claim is worth, however, the antitrust laws’ remedial
and deterrent functions potentially may no longer serve their purpose.164
Because the Clayton Act provides for trebled damages and reasonable
attorney’s fees and costs, Congress intended to encourage private citizens
to bring antitrust actions to supplement the efforts of state and federal
government.165 If a corporation can craft an arbitration agreement that
makes pursuing a claim prohibitively expensive, private suits will not be
brought in any forum and the statute will not function properly.166 Thus,
one of the factors that was not present in Mitsubishi Motors is present here:
if the arbitration agreement is specifically enforced, the plaintiffs would be
forced to forgo their substantive rights under the statute because they would
not be able to effectively vindicate their rights under the antitrust laws.167
Further, the statutory scheme of the antitrust laws would be undermined
because those private citizens seeking to enforce the antitrust laws would
be unable to bring a claim in any forum.168 Accordingly, the first prong of

forgo the substantive rights afforded by federal statutes simply by agreeing to arbitrate
a statutory claim).
162. See Italian Colors III, 667 F.3d at 210-11 (emphasizing that eradicating the
private enforcement component from the antitrust law scheme cannot be what Congress
intended when it included strong private enforcement mechanisms and incentives in the
antitrust statutes).
163. See Mitsubishi Motors, 473 U.S. at 632-35 (determining from the text and
legislative history of the Sherman Act that arbitration was not inherently consistent
with effective vindication of the federal antitrust laws).
164. See id. at 637 (indicating that a federal statute would not continue to serve its
remedial and deterrent functions if the prospective litigant may not effectively
vindicate its statutory cause of action).
165. See Hawaii v. Standard Oil Co. of Cal., 405 U.S. 251, 262 (1972) (holding that
Congress encouraged private citizens to serve as “private attorneys general” by offering
potential litigants trebled damages and attorney’s fees and costs).
166. See Carnegie v. Household Int’l Inc., 376 F.3d 656, 661 (7th Cir. 2004)
(recognizing the realistic alternative to a class action is not a multiplicity of individual
suits, but rather no individual suits, because the cost would dwarf the benefit).
167. Cf. Gilmer v. Interstate/Johnson Lane Corp., 500 U.S. 20, 26-29 (1991)
(finding that the plaintiff could effectively vindicate his rights in arbitration because the
forum provided for all of the remedies he could have received in litigation).
168. Accord Eisen v. Carlisle & Jacquelin, 417 U.S. 156, 161 (1974) (recognizing
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the vindication of rights inquiry under Mitsubishi Motors is satisfied
because the plaintiffs demonstrated that the functions of the antitrust laws
would not be in place and arbitration in this instance would tend to
undermine the statutory scheme.169
2. The Merchant Plaintiffs Met Their Burden of Proving They Would Incur
Prohibitive Costs Under Green Tree.
The plaintiffs in Italian Colors met their burden of proving prohibitive
costs under Green Tree through an expert economist’s affidavit that
described the level of expert fees necessary to successfully bring their
claim and posited that individual actions were financially infeasible.170 The
expert economist, after conducting initial research, concluded that the cost
for an expert economic study alone could exceed one million dollars, and
the average plaintiff could only expect less than six thousand dollars in
damages even after trebling.171 In his professional opinion, it was not
realistic for an individual to bring a claim in either arbitration or
litigation.172 Whereas the plaintiff in Green Tree did not provide any
evidence as to her likely costs, the plaintiffs in Italian Colors provided a
detailed affidavit from an expert economist, whose credibility was not
questioned, attesting to their prohibitive costs.173 Moreover, those costs are
necessary to handle the complex issues in proving American Express’s
tying arrangement and are not merely prohibitive in the sense that they do

that the class action may be the only economically rational alternative when a large
group suffers damages that are individually too small to justify bringing an individual
action).
169. See, e.g., Standard Oil Co., 405 U.S. at 275 (recognizing that private litigants
are a necessary aspect of antitrust enforcement to supplement the efforts of the
government).
170. Compare Green Tree Fin. Corp.-Ala. v. Randolph, 531 U.S. 79, 90 (2000)
(holding that a plaintiff asserting prohibitive costs as a basis for avoiding arbitration
bears the burden of proving the likelihood of incurring such costs), with Italian Colors
III, 667 F.3d 204, 218 (2d Cir.) (concluding an expert economist’s affidavit noting the
economic irrationality of bringing a claim met their burden of production), reh’g en
banc denied, 681 F.3d 139 (2d Cir.), cert. granted sub nom. Am. Express Co. v. Italian
Colors Rest., 133 S. Ct. 594 (2012), overruled by 133 S. Ct. 2304 (2013).
171. See Italian Colors III, 667 F.3d at 218 (noting that expert studies in individual
antitrust actions typically cost between $300,000 and $2,000,000, and that the
merchants’ claim would fall within that range).
172. See id. (determining that collective proceedings would be the only realistic
recourse for the plaintiffs where expert fees could cost one million dollars).
173. See id. at 218 (noting that American Express did not challenge the validity of
the economist’s affidavit); see also Green Tree, 531 U.S. at 90 (holding the arbitration
agreement was enforceable because the plaintiff did not provide any evidence to
substantiate her prohibitive costs claim).
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not provide enough incentive to bring a claim.174
Although most challenges to arbitration agreements have been
unsuccessful, arbitration agreements containing class action waivers are not
per se enforceable.175 Though prior Supreme Court precedent has almost
uniformly enforced arbitration agreements when there was an effective
vindication defense, the Court has rarely heard a case in which the
plaintiffs could actually demonstrate that in their specific case it would be
unjust to enforce the arbitration agreement because the plaintiffs could not
vindicate their rights.176 The facts of Italian Colors were unique in this
way because of the extremely high costs of pursuing a claim and the
remarkably low damages the merchants could expect as a result.177
The fatal flaw of Mitsubishi Motors was that the plaintiffs attempted to
persuade the Court to adopt a categorical rule that enforcing the particular
statute was inconsistent with arbitration.178 In Green Tree, the plaintiff
made a bare assertion of prohibitive costs with no evidence to substantiate
her claim.179 By contrast, upholding the Second Circuit’s decision in
Italian Colors would have simply imposed a case-by-case analysis by
which a court determines the costs each plaintiff would incur and the
deterrent effect those costs would have on a plaintiff’s ability to pursue a
claim.180 Indeed, the Second Circuit found the merchants offered much
174. See, e.g., Paschall v. Kansas City Star Co., 695 F.2d 332, 339 (8th Cir. 1982)
(citing Welsh v. Likins, 68 F.R.D. 589, 596-98 (D. Minn. 1975)) (recognizing that the
enormous expense of research and expert fees are indispensable to a plaintiff’s efforts
to successfully prove a complex antitrust claim); cf. Coneff v. AT&T Corp, 673 F.3d
1155, 1159 (9th Cir. 2012) (finding the arbitration agreement enforceable when the
inquiry was not whether the plaintiffs could effectively vindicate their rights but
whether they had the incentive to bring a claim).
175. See Italian Colors III, 667 F.3d at 217 (qualifying the fact that most plaintiffs
have not avoided arbitration because of prohibitive costs or their lack of sufficient
evidence to that end).
176. See Respondents’ Brief in Opposition at 10, Italian Colors III, No. 12-133,
2012 WL 4960369 (noting it would be a rare occurrence for a plaintiff to be able to
provide sufficient evidence of prohibitive costs to meet the Green Tree test).
177. See Italian Colors III, 667 F.3d at 218 (finding that enforcement of the class
action waiver in this case would flatly ensure no small merchant could challenge the
tying arrangement).
178. See Mitsubishi Motors Corp. v. Soler Chrysler-Plymouth, Inc., 473 U.S. 614,
627-35 (1975) (finding unpersuasive the plaintiff’s argument that antitrust actions
should not be subject to arbitration); accord Gilmer v. Interstate/Johnson Lane Corp.,
500 U.S. 20, 26-27 (1991) (rejecting plaintiff’s contention that ADEA actions as a
matter of law are incompatible with arbitration).
179. See Green Tree, 531 U.S. at 90 (finding the plaintiff’s prohibitive cost
argument did not rise beyond the speculative level).
180. See Italian Colors III, 667 F.3d at 219 (noting their holding did not render
arbitration agreements per se unenforceable, and instead required future parties to
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more than a bare assertion of prohibitive costs, and demonstrated that the
effect of the class action waiver is that no merchant will bring a claim and
American Express will not have to comply with the antitrust laws.181 In
sum, because the plaintiffs in Italian Colors satisfied both prongs of the
tests arising out of Mitsubishi Motors and Green Tree, the arbitration
agreement should have been invalidated.182
3. The Supreme Court’s Decision Failed to Apply These Tests and Came To
The Erroneous Conclusion That The Merchants’ “Right To Pursue” Their
Federal Statutory Claims Was Unimpaired.
i. The Court’s Conclusion That the Merchants Did Not Assert a
Prospective Waiver of Their “Right to Pursue” a Statutory Claim
Under Mitsubishi Motors Failed to Account for the Practical
Effect of the Arbitration Agreement as a Whole.
The Court rejected the merchants’ assertion that the arbitration
agreement was unenforceable as a “prospective waiver” of their federal
statutory rights because Mitsubishi Motors only condemned an arbitration
agreement that acts “as a prospective waiver of a party’s right to pursue
statutory remedies.”183 A class action waiver does not interfere with that
right on its face, the Court reasoned, and therefore cannot be invalidated
under Mitsubishi Motors.184 Moreover, the Court determined that the
ability to prove a claim is not synonymous with the “right to pursue” that
litigate the merits of their own waiver based on the particular facts of their case).
181. See id. at 218 (recognizing that trebling plaintiff’s expected damages would
still not pay for the expert fees estimated to be necessary to make a merchant’s case).
182. See id. at 216 (citing Shankle v. B-G Maint. Mgmt. of Colo., Inc., 163 F.3d
1230, 1234 (10th Cir. 1999) (acknowledging that arbitration is not an adequate
alternative forum for resolving statutory claims when the arbitration agreement is
constructed to remove the individual’s ability to bring such a claim).
183. See Am. Express Co. v. Italian Colors Rest., 133 S. Ct. 2304, 2310-11 (2013)
(citing Mitsubishi Motors Corp. v. Soler Chrysler-Plymouth, Inc., 473 U.S. 614, 637
n.9 (1985)) (dismissing the merchants’ argument that American Express’s arbitration
agreement acted as a prospective waiver of the parties’ federal statutory rights because
the merchants only had trouble proving their claim). The Court incorrectly asserted
that the vindication of rights doctrine as established by Mitsubishi Motors was purely
dicta. See id. at 2310 & n.2. The Court in Mitsubishi Motors quite clearly held that an
arbitration agreement was only enforceable “so long as the prospective litigant may
effectively vindicate its statutory cause of action in the arbitral forum.” 473 U.S. at
637. Still, even if the vindication of rights doctrine originated as dictum, it became law
when the Court applied its principles in Green Tree to hold that an arbitration
agreement is unenforceable if it makes arbitration prohibitively expensive. See Green
Tree Fin. Corp.-Ala. v. Randolph, 513 U.S. 79, 90 (2000).
184. See Italian Colors, 133 S. Ct. at 2311 (positing that a class action waiver still
preserves a party’s right to bring a claim individually in arbitration).
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claim, and therefore the merchants’ claim did not fall under the rule.185
An arbitration agreement that prevents a party from compiling the proof
that is necessary to pursue the claim, however, has effectively inhibited the
party’s “right to pursue” that claim.186 In Mitsubishi Motors, the Court
stated that when an arbitration agreement “operat[es] . . . as a prospective
waiver” of a party’s right to pursue a federal statutory claim, it must be
invalidated.187 The Court also stated that an arbitration agreement is only
enforceable “so long as the prospective litigant effectively may vindicate its
statutory cause of action in the arbitral forum.”188 Indeed, the Court
emphasized that an arbitration agreement would be “set[ ] aside” if
“proceedings in the contractual forum [would] be so gravely difficult” that
the prospective litigant would “for all practical purposes would be
deprived of his day in court.”189 Reading these conclusions together makes
clear that the cumulative effect of the arbitration agreement determines its
enforceability, not whether any one provision is “baldly exculpatory.”190
As such, the dissent got it right: “[w]hen an arbitration agreement prevents
the effective vindication of statutory rights, a party may go to court.”191
An arbitration agreement indeed prevents the effective vindication of
statutory rights when it explicitly prohibits a party from bringing a certain
claim.192 But an arbitration agreement no less prohibits the effective
185. See id. (asserting that the class action waiver itself did not affect the right to
effective vindication of a statutory claim because class actions were not always
required to realize such vindication of the rights under the antitrust laws).
186. See id. at 2314 (Kagan, J., dissenting) (illustrating potential examples of
clauses that would have the same affect as the “baldly exculpatory” provisions that the
Court would condemn but that would be upheld under the majority’s interpretation of
the vindication of rights doctrine).
187. See Mitsubishi Motors Corp. v. Soler Chrysler-Plymouth, Inc. 473 U.S. 614,
637 n.19 (1985) (stating that the Court would “have no trouble condemning” an
arbitration agreement whose provisions effectively prevented a party from pursuing a
federal statutory claim).
188. See id. at 637 (emphasis added) (requiring the parties to arbitrate because there
had been no argument that the particular arbitration agreement precluded the claimant
from effectively vindicating its rights in arbitration).
189. See id. at 632 (internal quotation marks omitted) (positing that an arbitration
agreement that was unconscionable would not be enforced under the FAA).
190. See Italian Colors, 133 S. Ct. at 2317-18 (Kagan, J., dissenting) (considering
the “world of other provisions” a drafter could create to limit its liability without
including a “baldly exculpatory” provision).
191. See id. at 2317 (arguing that the vindication of rights doctrine as perceived by
Mitsubishi Motors and Green Tree could come in to play in a wide variety of
circumstances and that a holistic view of the agreement is necessary to determine its
enforceability).
192. See id. at 2310 (majority opinion) (conceding that an agreement explicitly
barring a party from bringing a certain federal statutory claim would fall under the
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vindication of statutory rights when the provisions collectively have the
same effect, however the drafter is able to realize that result.193 In this case,
the Court ignored that the merchants essentially no longer have the “right
to pursue” their antitrust claims because the arbitration agreement
forecloses all possible ways for the merchants to present an expert report
necessary to prove their antitrust claims.194 Thus, the merchants still met
their burden under Mitsubishi Motors because the agreement deprived the
merchants of any feasible way to vindicate their rights under the antitrust
laws. 195
ii. The Court Erroneously Concluded That the Costs Necessary to
Prove the Merchants’ Antitrust Claims Were Outside of the Scope
of the Court’s Holding in Green Tree.
American Express asserted, and the Court impliedly agreed, that any
asserted prohibitive costs must be those that are unique to arbitration, such
as the initial filing fee and the costs for the arbitrator.196 Because the expert
and attorney’s fees that the merchants claimed were prohibitive were not
unique to arbitration, those costs cannot be used as a mechanism to avoid
arbitration.197 The Court couched this conclusion in its determination that a
prohibitively expensive filing fee—which facially restricts access to the
arbitral forum—was categorically different from a prohibitively expensive
expert study that is necessary to prove a claim.198 Still, because the cost to
prove a claim would be the same in litigation and arbitration absent any
agreement to the contrary, this is arguably the distinction the Court actually
drew.199 This reasoning is erroneous and is a misapplication of the holding
vindication of rights doctrine).
193. See id. at 2317 (Kagan, J., dissenting) (maintaining that any variety of clauses
could have the same effect as a clause that is blatantly exculpatory, but that still renders
the clause a “prospective waiver” of a party’s federal statutory rights).
194. See id. at 2320 (lamenting that American Express successfully shielded itself
from antitrust liability because of the Court’s interpretation of the FAA).
195. See id. at 2316-17 (asserting that the Second Circuit was correct in concluding
that Italian Colors met its burden under Mitsubishi Motors that the arbitration
agreement was unenforceable because it effectively precluded the merchants from
vindicating their rights under the antitrust laws).
196. See id. at 2310-11; Petition for Writ of Certiorari, supra note 13, at 18
(considering Green Tree’s reference to large arbitration costs to mean costs that would
not be borne in litigation and thus would preclude access to the arbitral forum).
197. See Italian Colors, 133 S. Ct. at 2310-11; Petition for Writ of Certiorari, supra
note 13, at 19 (arguing that the dicta in Green Tree related to the “price of admission,”
and did not warrant expansion to include costs that could be incurred in both litigation
and arbitration).
198. See Italian Colors, 133 S. Ct. at 2310-11.
199. See id. at 2311 n.3 (“But more importantly, [a clause prohibiting a party from
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in Green Tree.200
As a threshold matter, the prohibitive costs asserted by the merchants
arguably would be unique to arbitration because the class action waiver
would only apply if American Express elected to use arbitration.201
Therefore, even assuming prohibitive costs were required to be unique to
arbitration, the plaintiffs still met their burden of proving prohibitive
costs.202 Still, this distinction is not in accord with the central holding in
Green Tree.203
The Court in Green Tree recognized that a plaintiff could avoid
arbitration on the “ground that arbitration would be prohibitively
expensive,” not that filing fees and arbitrator’s costs would be prohibitively
expensive.204 Nor did the Court state whether the nature of the prohibitive
expenses had any bearing on the analysis.205 Though the Court referenced
the cost of admission as the relevant inquiry for prohibitive costs, it did not
limit the cost of admission to the costs that the plaintiff asserted may be
prohibitive in her case.206 Put differently, just because the plaintiff in

presenting expert testimony], assuming it makes vindication of a claim impossible,
makes it impossible not just as a class action but even as an individual claim.”).
200. See, e.g., Bradford v. Rockwell Semiconductor Sys., Inc., 238 F.3d 549, 556
(4th Cir. 2001) (stating that prohibitive costs are only concerned with the amount of
money ultimately paid by the plaintiff because plaintiffs would be deterred from
pursuing their statutory rights no matter who receives their funds).
201. See Respondents’ Brief in Opposition at 14, Am. Express Co. v, Italian
Colors Restaurant, No. 12-133 (2012) (noting that the plaintiffs would only be forced

to pay prohibitive costs under the arbitration agreement but would not have to outside
arbitration).
202. See Italian Colors III, 667 F.3d 204, 218-19 (2d Cir.) (finding that the plaintiffs
met their burden of proving the likelihood of incurring prohibitive costs based on the
expert economist affidavit), reh’g en banc denied, 681 F.3d 139 (2d Cir. 2012), cert.
granted sub nom. Am. Express Co. v. Italian Colors Rest., 133 S. Ct. 594 (2012),
overruled by 133 S. Ct. 2304 (2013).
203. See Am. Express Co. v. Italian Colors Rest., 133 S. Ct. 2304, 2316 (2013)
(Kagan, J., dissenting) (arguing that the merchants’ expert study constituted a
prohibitive cost because “[n]o rational actor would bring a claim worth tens of
thousands of dollars if doing so meant incurring costs in the hundreds of thousands”).
204. See Green Tree Fin. Corp.-Ala. v. Randolph, 531 U.S. 79, 90 (2000)
(recognizing that prohibitive costs could prevent a litigant from effectively vindicating
federal statutory rights, which would make the arbitration agreement unenforceable).
205. See id. at 91 (choosing not to analyze what would constitute a sufficient
demonstration of prohibitive costs because the plaintiff developed no evidentiary
record on that point).
206. See id. at 84 (referencing the potentially prohibitive arbitration costs for a
plaintiff, including the filing fee and paying the arbitrator); cf. In re Am. Express
Merch. Litig., 681 F.3d 139, 142 (2d Cir.) (Pooler, J., concurring) (noting that the
merchants were prosecuting claims that would require more extensive proof than other
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Green Tree claimed that the arbitrator’s compensation and filing fees
would be prohibitive does not mean that the cost of admission does not
include anything necessary to bring a successful claim.207 The Supreme
Court’s conclusion in Italian Colors that the “right to pursue” a federal
statutory remedy is not implicated by prohibitive costs involved in proving
that claim does not comport with Green Tree’s analysis.208 The proper
inquiry is whether an arbitration agreement prevents a party from
effectively vindicating federal statutory rights because of prohibitive
expenses, and the Court does not distinguish between potential forms of
prohibitive costs.209 If the concern is the practical effect arbitration will
have on a particular litigant’s ability to bring a claim, which it should be
under Mitsubishi Motors, the form of the expense is almost irrelevant.210
That the costs are in the form of expert fees makes them no less prohibitive
from the litigant’s point of view than if they were filing fees or the cost for
the arbitrator.211 Either way, the litigant is precluded from bringing a
claim, and the purpose and function of the applicable federal statute is not
served.212
Prohibitive costs, additionally, do not need to be unique to arbitration
because the correct comparison after Concepcion is not between litigation
statutory claims, which later courts could analyze in determining whether plaintiffs
made their showing of prohibitive costs), denying reh’g en banc to Italian Colors III,
667 F.3d 204 (2d Cir. 2012).
207. See Respondents’ Brief in Opposition, supra note 201, at 15 (reckoning that the
analysis in Green Tree acknowledged that arbitration costs could be prohibitively
expensive, but it did not emphasize that only forum-specific costs were relevant to the
prohibitive costs inquiry).
208. See American Express Co. v. Italian Colors Restaurant, 133 S. Ct. 2304, 2311
(2013) (asserting that “the fact that it is not worth the expense involved in proving a
statutory remedy does not constitute the elimination of the right to pursue that
remedy”).
209. See id. at 2317 (Kagan, J., dissenting) (arguing that that the majority’s
exclusion of the cost of proof from the prohibitive inquiry was foreclosed by Mitsubishi
Motors and Green Tree); Morrison v. Circuit City Stores, Inc., 317 F.3d 646, 660 (6th
Cir. 2003) (en banc); Bradford v. Rockwell Semiconductor Sys., Inc., 238 F.3d 549,
556 (4th Cir. 2001) (believing the effect on the plaintiffs is the same no matter who
receives their funds).
210. See Morrison, 317 F.3d at 664 (including the fact that attorneys cover most of
the fees and advance the expenses in litigation into its analysis of whether a plaintiff
would incur prohibitive costs in arbitration).
211. See id. (instructing courts to consider the costs a litigant would face in litigation
vis-à-vis arbitration, and whether the additional costs of arbitration would deter
plaintiffs with a statutory claim from bringing that claim in arbitration).
212. See Bradford, 238 F.3d at 556 (reasoning that a claimant could not be deterred
from pursuing a claim in arbitration simply because his fees would be paid to the
arbitrator).
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and arbitration, but between bilateral arbitration and class arbitration.213 In
Concepcion, the Court analyzed the differences between bilateral and class
arbitration to hold that the change from bilateral to class arbitration would
be fundamental and would completely change the character of the
proceedings.214 According to the Court, the switch from bilateral to class
arbitration greatly increases the costs to the defendants in the form of
greater procedure and higher risks.215 It is appropriate, then, to use the
same mode of analysis when considering the plaintiff’s costs, rather than
American Express’s comparison of arbitration to litigation.216
Comparing the cost differential between bilateral and class arbitration
from the plaintiff’s point of view makes clear that the change would
similarly be fundamental.217 If the plaintiffs were permitted to proceed as a
class, they would be able to spread out the costs of experts and attorneys to
make proving their claim more manageable.218 If they were forced to each
initiate individual actions in arbitration, those costs could not be spread out,
and the result is that no plaintiff will bring a claim at all.219 Thus,
examining the issue of prohibitive costs the way the Court framed the
analysis in Concepcion again leads to the conclusion that the merchants in
Italian Colors would face prohibitive costs if compelled to resolve their

213. See AT&T Mobility LLC v. Concepcion, 131 S. Ct. 1740, 1751 (2011)
(comparing bilateral and class arbitration to conclude that the changes between the two
are fundamental). But see Petition for Writ of Certiorari, supra note 13, at 18-19
(comparing the cost differential between litigation and arbitration to argue that
prohibitive costs must be those that are strictly unique to arbitration).
214. See Concepcion, 131 S. Ct. at 1750-51 (holding that because class arbitration
would sacrifice the principle advantages of arbitration and increase costs to the
defendants, the Discover Bank rule unduly interfered with the FAA).
215. See id. at 1751-52 (finding that greater procedures, particularly those
procedures involved in class actions, would be too complex and high-risk for
arbitration in the absence of multilayered review).
216. See Petition for Writ of Certiorari, supra note 13, at 18-9 (comparing the cost
differential between litigation and arbitration to argue that prohibitive costs must be
those that are strictly unique to arbitration).
217. See Respondents’ Brief in Opposition, supra note 201, at 14 (noting that the
merchants could spread the expert and attorney’s fees amongst other merchants in
litigation but do not get that luxury in arbitration).
218. See Italian Colors III, 667 F.3d 204, 209-210 (2d Cir.) (citing the arbitration
clause of American Express’s Merchant Agreement, which only precludes aggregation
of claims if the parties elect to use arbitration), reh’g en banc denied, 681 F.3d 139 (2d
Cir.), cert. granted sub nom. Am. Express Co. v. Italian Colors Rest., 133 S. Ct. 594
(2012), overruled by 133 S. Ct. 2304 (2013).
219. See id. at 219 (concluding that the class action waiver is a de facto waiver of
liability for the defendants because it makes individual arbitration so expensive that no
merchant will bring a claim).
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dispute in arbitration.220 In sum, no matter how the inquiry is framed or
what costs are considered, the plaintiffs successfully demonstrated that
prohibitive costs would inhibit their ability to vindicate their federal
statutory rights in arbitration, and the agreement cannot be enforced.221
C. Concepcion Does Not Directly Apply to Italian Colors Because the
Vindication of Rights Doctrine Arose Out of Federal Law and Did Not
Suffer From the Same Pitfalls as the Discover Bank Rule.
The Second Circuit and the dissent interpreted Concepcion’s holding
strictly as an application of obstacle preemption, but the majority
interpreted Concepcion more broadly to prohibit any attempts to evade
binding arbitration, even if the plaintiff could not vindicate her federal
statutory rights.222 Even if the rule arising out of Italian Colors was
synonymous with the Discover Bank rule preempted in Concepcion, which
it is not, the dissent correctly pointed out that the Concepcion Court did not
address the effect its holding would have on a federal statutory right.223
The Court was silent on its earlier holdings relating to the effective
vindication of federal statutory rights in Mitsubishi Motors and Green
Tree.224 The Court did not mention these cases because Concepcion simply
found a state law was preempted as an obstacle to a federal objective, and
the Concepcions did not establish they could not adequately vindicate their
rights.225
Moreover, the Court erroneously conflated Concepcion’s preemption
220. See Concepcion, 131 S. Ct. at 1751 (indicating that the switch from bilateral to
class arbitration was the appropriate inquiry for determining whether a judge-made rule
impinged on the FAA); Italian Colors III, 667 F.3d at 215-16 (recognizing that class
arbitration may be the only effective mechanism for vindicating the merchants’ rights
in this particular case).
221. See Italian Colors III, 667 F.3d at 212 (finding valid grounds existed for
revoking the class action waiver under the FAA because the plaintiffs demonstrated
arbitration was prohibitively expensive).
222. See, e.g., Ranier v. Citigroup, Inc., 827 F. Supp. 2d 294, 310 (S.D.N.Y. 2011)
(suggesting Conception could be interpreted to permit courts to uphold arbitration
agreements even if the practical effect of enforcement was to leave plaintiffs without an
adequate forum to vindicate their rights under state law).
223. See AT&T Mobility LLC v. Concepcion, 131 S. Ct. 1740, 1748 (2011)
(holding that Congress did not intend, by enacting the savings clause of the FAA, to
uphold state laws that contravene the FAA’s objectives).
224. See Italian Colors III, 667 F.3d at 216 (reasoning that the vindication of rights
doctrine was preserved after Concepcion because the Court did not mention either
Mitsubishi Motors or Green Tree).
225. See Concepcion, 131 S. Ct. at 1752 (finding that “[s]tates cannot require a
procedure that is inconsistent with the FAA, even if it is desirable for unrelated
reasons”).
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analysis with the harmonization of two federal statutes.226 When a state
law is in conflict with a federal law, the federal law prevails.227 That is not
the case when two federal laws are in conflict.228 The FAA should not
override the federal antitrust laws because class arbitration requires more
procedure than bilateral arbitration.229 Thus, Concepcion should not have
been read more broadly to encompass the challenge brought by the
merchants in Italian Colors.230 Still, even under a broad reading of
Concepcion, because the facts surrounding and including the arbitration
agreement are sufficiently different, the Court should not have concluded
that Concepcion controlled whether this particular arbitration agreement
was enforceable under the FAA.231
1. The Dissent Was Correct That Italian Colors Is Distinguishable From
Concepcion Because the Vindication of Rights Doctrine Does Not Pose the
Same Preemption Concerns, Nor Was the Doctrine Contemplated By
Concepcion.
The dissent was correct that Concepcion was not relevant to the
disposition of this case.232 First, Concepcion disposed of the Discover
Bank rule on preemption grounds, because the state law acted as an
obstacle to the objective of a federal law.233 Here, the Court was charged
226. See Am. Express Co. v. Italian Colors Rest., 133 S. Ct. 2304, 2312 (2013)
(opining that Concepcion “all but resolves this case” because Concepcion prohibits a
court from imposing procedural barriers to arbitration or requiring the availability of
class proceedings).
227. See Silkwood v. Kerr-McGee Corp., 464 U.S. 238, 248 (1984) (stating that
federal law can preempt state law when the state law is an obstacle to the
accomplishment of federal objectives).
228. See United States v. Palumbo Bros., Inc., 145 F.3d 850, 861-62 (7th Cir. 1998)
(noting that preemption analysis is inapplicable when two federal statutes are in
conflict).
229. See Ranier v. Citigroup, Inc., 827 F. Supp. 2d 294, 310 (S.D.N.Y. 2011)
(reasoning that even a broad reading of Concepcion would not warrant a finding that
the analysis articulated in Italian Colors was invalid).
230. See In re Am. Express Merch. Litig., 681 F.3d at 140 (Pooler, J., concurring)
(finding the Concepcion Court’s failure to mention the line of cases establishing the
vindication of rights doctrine an indication that those holdings were still good law).
231. See id. (noting a critical distinction between Italian Colors III and Concepcion
in the fee-shifting provisions that could make the plaintiffs whole in Concepcion but
not Italian Colors III).
232. See American Express Co. v. Italian Colors Restaurant, 133 S. Ct. 2304, 2320
(2013) (Kagan, J., dissenting) (asserting that Concepcion is irrelevant to this case
because Concepcion concerned a state law that barred class action waivers even when
class proceedings were unnecessary to sufficiently vindicate a claimant’s rights).
233. See AT&T Mobility LLC v. Concepcion. 131 S. Ct. 1740, 1747-48 (2011)
(concluding that the Discover Bank rule interfered with the FAA’s mandate to favor the

http://digitalcommons.wcl.american.edu/jgspl/vol21/iss4/7

38

Wolf: "To a Hammer Everything Looks Like a Nail": The Supreme Court's .

2013]

DISTINGUISHING CONCEPCION

989

with reconciling two conflicting federal interests.234 Because Concepcion
was not charged with making that reconciliation, the Court had to give the
vindication of rights doctrine independent consideration on that basis
alone.235 Second, the Concepcions sought to invalidate an arbitration
agreement because it did not contain a class action waiver, regardless of
whether a class action was necessary for the Concepcions to resolve the
dispute.236 The merchants in Italian Colors, on the other hand, sought to
invalidate an arbitration agreement because the cumulative effect of all of
the provisions in the arbitration agreement foreclosed the merchants’ ability
to bring their antitrust claims.237 As the dissent correctly pointed out, the
Court’s view that the merchants’ claim rested solely on the availability of
class actions is the sole connection between Concepcion and Italian
Colors.238 Moreover, Concepcion did not answer the crux of the question
in this case: whether an arbitration agreement is unenforceable if the
plaintiffs can demonstrate that the terms of the agreement effectively
prevent them from bringing a claim.239 Contrary to the Court’s assertion,
Concepcion did not address this question because the Court concluded that
the Concepcions could effectively vindicate their rights under the terms of

enforcement of arbitration agreements according to their terms by continually
invalidating arbitration agreements with class action waivers).
234. See Italian Colors, 133 S. Ct. at 2320 (Kagan, J., dissenting) (opining that
Italian Colors is distinguishable from Concepcion because standard preemption
analysis is inapplicable to a potential conflict between two federal statutes); Italian
Colors III, 667 F.3d 204, 213 (2d Cir. 2012) (asserting that Concepcion was inapposite
because the vindication of rights doctrine is rooted in federal law of arbitrability),
overruled by 133 S. Ct. 2304 (2013).
235. See Italian Colors, 133 U.S. at 2320 (Kagan, J., dissenting) (arguing that
because Concepcion was not charged with harmonizing any tension between two
federal statutes, the vindication of rights doctrine was not implicated by the decision).
236. See Concepcion, 131 S. Ct. at 1753 (emphasizing that the Concepcions did not
need the benefit of class proceedings in order to be made whole).
237. See Italian Colors, 133 S. Ct. at 2318 (Kagan, J., dissenting) (arguing that the
case at hand could not solely be concerned with class action waivers because the
agreement needs to be viewed as a whole to determine if it indeed does not provide any
avenue for effective vindication).
238. See id. (positing that the viability of Concepcion in the majority opinion rested
solely in the “false premise” that the merchants were only challenging American
Express’s use of the class action waiver).
239. See id. (noting that the vindication of rights doctrine was not discussed in
Concepcion because the Court was not faced with an issue in which the parties at hand
could not effectively vindicate their rights in arbitration); Concepcion, 131 S.Ct. at
1753 (holding that the Discover Bank rule was an impermissible obstacle to the FAA
because it invalidated class actions even where unnecessary for the particular claim to
be resolved).
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As such, Concepcion does not “all but

2. Unlike the Discover Bank Rule, the Vindication of Rights Doctrine
Applied a Case-by-Case Test and Thus Would Not Have a
Disproportionate Impact on Arbitration Agreements.
Although the Discover Bank rule on its face applied to all contracts
equally, the effect of the rule would be to displace arbitration
agreements.242 The test envisioned by the California Supreme Court
purported to provide for a case-by-case analysis, but was so broad that it
was, in effect, a categorical rule that made class action waivers per se
unenforceable.243 The Discover Bank rule intended only to cover consumer
contracts of adhesion, but the Court found that failed to limit the rule’s
scope.244 Also, the rule failed to describe what constitutes small damages
or how verifiable a claim of unfair practices must be by the time the
defendant moves to compel arbitration.245 The result would allow most
consumers in California to bring a claim under the Discover Bank rule and
avoid arbitration even though they could effectively vindicate their rights
through bilateral arbitration.246
The Second Circuit’s reasoning in Italian Colors did, however, provide
the limiting principle that was missing in Discover Bank.247 Rather than

240. See Concepcion, 131 S. Ct. at 1753.
241. See Italian Colors, 133 S. Ct. at 2312 (asserting that because Concepcion
invalidated previous attempts to interfere with the “primary attributes” of arbitration,
Concepcion “all but resolves this case”).
242. See AT&T Moility v. Concepcion, 131 S. Ct. 1740, 1750-51 (2011)
(concluding that the rule, though on its face applied to all contracts equally, would have
a disproportionate impact on arbitration agreements, and thus fell outside of section 2
of the FAA).
243. See id. at 1750-51 (holding that the Discover Bank rule would effectively
manufacture class arbitration rather than allow parties to arbitrate according to the
terms of their agreement).
244. See id. at 1750 (finding that it would be rare today to come across a consumer
contract that was not an adhesion contract and most such contracts include arbitration
clauses).
245. See id. (noting the second and third prongs of the Discover Bank rule are so
“toothless and malleable” that they have no limiting effect and any consumer could
demand class arbitration).
246. See id. at 1753 (recognizing that AT&T’s arbitration agreement was so
consumer-friendly that the Concepcions would not only have been made whole, but
would have been better off in arbitration).
247. See Italian Colors III, 667 F.3d 204, 212-14 (2d Cir.) (indicating Discover
Bank employed a blanket prohibition on class action waivers, whereas the merchants
sought revocation of the arbitration agreement in their particular instance), reh’g en
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creating a test that purports to apply to all contracts but in fact disfavors
arbitration, the Second Circuit’s vindication of rights analysis required a
detailed inquiry into the specifics of each plaintiff’s case, what costs are
necessary to make that case, and whether those costs are prohibitive.248
The vindication of rights doctrine as applied by the Second Circuit and the
dissent would not have opened the floodgates for anyone who signed a
class action waiver to avoid arbitration, as feared by the Court in
Concepcion.249 The Second Circuit and the dissent both emphasized that
most plaintiffs who have brought a prohibitive costs defense in the past
have failed because of the high bar set by Green Tree to prove prohibitive
costs.250 Thus, the rule would not tend to disfavor arbitration or have a
disproportionate impact on arbitration agreements; it would only affect the
plaintiffs who could provide sufficient evidence to demonstrate they
actually could not vindicate their rights.251
3. In Italian Colors, the Merchants Could Not Be Made Whole Through
Bilateral Arbitration Because the Arbitration Agreement Did Not Have
Similar Customer-Friendly Provisions.
In Concepcion, the arbitration agreement drafted by AT&T had a
number of consumer-friendly provisions that made even bilateral
arbitration an attractive alternative to litigation.252 Notably, the parties
stipulated that AT&T would pay all costs for non-frivolous claims and
would pay a seven thousand five hundred dollar premium if the arbitrator
gives an award greater than AT&T’s last settlement offer.253 The district
banc denied, 681 F.3d 139 (2d Cir.), cert. granted sub nom. Am. Express Co. v. Italian
Colors Rest., 133 S. Ct. 594 (2012), overruled by 133 S. Ct. 2304 (2013).
248. See id. at 218 (emphasizing that the weight of the evidence plaintiffs offered to
prove their prohibitive costs defense in finding the arbitration agreement was
unenforceable).
249. See In re Am. Express Merch. Litig., 681 F.3d 139, 142 (2d Cir.) (Pooler, J.,
concurring) (noting that the decision will not permit every future plaintiff to establish a
“vindication of rights” defense by hiring expensive attorneys and artfully choosing
experts), denying reh’g en banc to Italian Colors III, 667 F.3d 204 (2d Cir. 2012).
250. See Italian Colors III, 667 F.3d at 217 (citing cases in the Fourth and Third
Circuits in which plaintiffs failed to prove prohibitive costs; considering that failure a
lack of sufficient evidence and thus an unviable legal theory).
251. See id. (finding that the burden of proof on a plaintiff to demonstrate the
existence of prohibitive costs is high, and that courts will be able to decide when a
record is sufficient).
252. See AT&T Mobility LLC v. Concepcion, 131 S. Ct. 1740, 1745 (2011) (noting
AT&T’s arbitration agreement made it easy for consumers to go through the arbitration
process and involved few procedures).
253. See id. (noting AT&T additionally agreed it could not seek reimbursement of
its attorney’s fees and stipulated that the arbitrator could award any form of individual
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court and the Ninth Circuit both found that use of arbitration was likely to
make the plaintiff whole even if the case never reached arbitration or
litigation and could potentially provide excess payment.254 Additionally,
the district court found that consumers who were members of a class would
likely be worse off than a consumer who arbitrated on an individual
basis.255 Thus, the Court did not consider the effect prohibitive costs might
have on a litigant’s ability to pursue a claim because there were no
prohibitive costs.256 In fact, the Concepcions’ fiscal ability to pursue a
claim in arbitration without aggregating their claims was one of the
linchpins in the Court’s reasoning.257
In Italian Colors, American Express provided no such incentives.258
Instead, it mandated that all merchants that wanted to resolve a dispute pay
all of the up-front costs and bear the full risk of losing.259 In contrast to the
district court’s finding that the Concepcions could be made whole or even
be better off in bilateral arbitration, the merchants in Italian Colors

relief).
254. See id. at 1752 (concluding that, as is the case with class action litigation, class
action arbitration will force defendants to settle unmeritorious claims).
255. See id. at 1753 (finding consumers who proceeded as a class would be worse
off because of the time value of money and the opportunity to only receive “a small
percentage of a few dollars”).
256. See id. (stating the Concepcions were given sufficient incentives to arbitrate
their disputes in bilateral arbitration).
257. See id. at 1753 (noting the Ninth Circuit’s concession that aggrieved customers
who filed complaints with AT&T would be essentially guaranteed to be made whole
and would be better off engaging in bilateral arbitration than proceeding as a class).
The Concepcion Court assumed that the Concepcions did not need the benefit of the
class action mechanism to resolve their dispute because of AT&T’s consumer-friendly
provisions. See id. While it is true that those provisions made it more likely the
Concepcions would bring a claim than the merchants in Italian Colors, those
provisions still may not have provided an adequate incentive to bring a claim. Whether
or not a party has adequate incentive to bring a claim, however, is not the wrong that
the vindication of rights doctrine attempts to remedy. See, e.g., Coneff v. AT&T Corp.,
673 F.3d 1155, 1159 (9th Cir. 2012) (finding the arbitration agreement enforceable
when the inquiry was whether the plaintiffs had sufficient incentive to bring a claim,
not whether the plaintiffs had the ability to effectively vindicate their rights).
258. See Italian Colors III, 667 F.3d 204, 209-10 (2d Cir.) (finding the terms of
American Express’s arbitration agreement to amount to a waiver of liability), reh’g en
banc denied, 681 F.3d 139 (2d Cir.), cert. granted sub nom. Am. Express Co. v. Italian
Colors Rest., 133 S. Ct. 594 (2012).
259. See Am. Express Co. v. Italian Colors Rest., 570 U.S. 2304 (2013) (Kagan, J.,
dissenting) (noting that American Express’s arbitration agreement, in addition to the
class action waiver, included a prohibition on joinder or consolidation, precluded any
cost-shifting, and imposed a confidentiality provision that foreclosed the possibility
that merchants could agree to share an expert report).
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provided persuasive evidence that they would not even come close.260
On its face, the fee-shifting provisions provided by the Clayton Act
appear to have the same effect as AT&T’s agreement to assume all of the
claimants’ costs.261 However, a closer look demonstrates that the cost
shifting that the Clayton Act provides would not make the plaintiffs
whole.262 First, the Clayton Act does not have a fee-shifting provision for
expert fees, which account for the majority of the merchants’ prohibitive
costs.263 Second, the Clayton Act’s provision for the shifting of reasonable
attorney’s fees and costs will not fully account for the merchants’
expenses.264 Attorney’s fees are typically not awarded in excess of the
value of the underlying claim, which is miniscule in this case compared to
what the fees will ultimately be.265 Consequently, because most attorneys
counsel plaintiffs on a contingency-fee basis, no competent attorney would
take on such a complex antitrust case when she could only hope to recover
a small percentage of what her representation is worth.266 As a result, the
very costs that the merchants asserted were prohibitive could not be
recouped in arbitration even if they won their case.267

260. See Italian Colors III, 667 F.3d at 217-19 (relying on an expert economist’s
affidavit to find that the merchants could not feasibly pursue their antitrust claims on an
individual basis in arbitration).
261. See 15 U.S.C. § 15(a) (2006) (providing an award of the cost of the suit,
including a reasonable attorney’s fee, for successful private party plaintiffs in an
antitrust suit).
262. See Brief for Trial Lawyers for Public Justice as Amici Curiae Supporting
Plaintiff-Appellants at 6, Italian Colors Rest. v. Am. Express Travel Related Serv. Co.,
554 F.3d 300 (2d Cir. 2009) (No. 06-1871-cv) (presuming the district court interpreted
the Clayton Act provision to mean successful plaintiffs could recoup all of their costs).
263. See Crawford Fitting Co. v. J.T. Gibbons, Inc., 482 U.S. 437, 441-42 (1987)
(noting that the Clayton Act prohibits courts to award expert fees in excess of thirty
dollars).
264. See Brief for Trial Lawyers for Public Justice, supra note 262, at 10 (finding
the merchant plaintiffs would not be able to obtain representation unless they paid out
of their own pockets because the Clayton Act fee-shifting provisions are inadequate).
265. See id. at 7-8 (noting that attorney’s fees are never awarded in excess of the
underlying claim which, in this case, would cause a law firm to lose money because
damages are so minimal).
266. See Kristian v. Comcast Corp., 446 F.3d 25, 58-59 (1st Cir. 2006) (noting the
large initial outlay in time and money for a plaintiff’s attorney in antitrust suits and the
uncertainty of success, which makes these claims unattractive for attorneys).
267. See Italian Colors III, 667 F.3d 204, 209-10 (2d Cir. 2012) (finding the
plaintiffs could not effectively vindicate their rights in arbitration because expert and
attorney’s fees would be prohibitively expensive), reh’g en banc denied, 681 F.3d 139
(2d Cir.), cert. granted sub nom. Am. Express Co. v. Italian Colors Rest., 133 S. Ct.
594 (2012), overruled by 133 S. Ct. 2304 (2013).
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4. The Dicta in Concepcion Regarding Prohibitive Costs Does Not Apply to
Italian Colors Because It Was Outside the Context of the Vindication of
Rights Doctrine.
The Concepcion Court did briefly mention the possibility that small
dollar claims could keep a litigant from bringing a claim, but because those
plaintiffs had a sufficient financial incentive to arbitrate, the Court did not
strongly consider the question.268 The possibility that prohibitive costs
could keep a litigant out of court, then, is still a viable avenue for plaintiffs
who meet their burden of production to avoid arbitration under Section
Two of the FAA.269 Not only is it still good law, but it is necessary in
situations like the one presented here.270 Because the vindication of rights
doctrine would not disfavor arbitration, there are no incentives to arbitrate,
and the merchants could not recoup their costs. It would be inequitable and
contrary to established precedent to enforce the arbitration agreement.271
IV. POLICY IMPLICATIONS AND SUGGESTIONS
A. Without the Rule Adopted By the Second Circuit in Italian Colors, the
Class Action Mechanism Will Be Largely Unavailable for the Small-Dollar
Claims It Was Created to Protect, and Will Allow Businesses to Avoid
Culpability for Violating Consumers’ Rights.
As the Supreme Court has continued to favor arbitration over litigation
and has endorsed the use of broad arbitration clauses, businesses have been
able to insert onerous arbitration agreements in an array of contracts.272
This is so even when the parties, such as the merchants in Italian Colors,
are considered sophisticated because they still may have little or no
bargaining power.273 The Court in Concepcion correctly pointed out that
268. See AT&T Mobility LLC v. Concepcion, 131 S. Ct. 1740, 1753 (2011)
(considering the dissent’s argument that class action waivers were necessary for small
dollar claims that could slip through the legal system “desirable for unrelated reasons”).
269. See Italian Colors III, 667 F.3d at 217 (finding that the lack of plaintiffs’
success in proving prohibitive costs under the vindication of rights doctrine went to
“the quality of the evidence presented, not the viability of the legal theory”).
270. See Concepcion, 131 S. Ct. at 1760 (Breyer, J., dissenting) (highlighting the
benefits of class proceedings in situations where small-dollar claimants would more
likely decide not to bring suit in any forum on an individual basis).
271. See Mitsubishi Motors Corp. v. Soler Chrysler-Plymouth, Inc., 473 U.S. 614,
637 (1985) (concluding that as long as a potential litigant may effectively vindicate its
statutory claim in arbitration, the statute continues to serve its function).
272. See, e.g., Gilmer v. Interstate/Johnson Lane Corp., 500 U.S. 20, 33 (1991)
(holding arbitration clauses in employment contracts were consistent with the FAA).
273. See Andrea Doneff, Arbitration Clauses in Contracts of Adhesion Trap
“Sophisticated Parties” Too, 2010 J. DISP. RESOL. 235, 249-50 (2010) (finding that the
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the days when consumer contracts were not contracts of adhesion are a
thing of the past.274 After Concepcion, the widespread use of broad
arbitration clauses will be even more pervasive because the Court has
essentially shown businesses how to craft an agreement that will shield
them from liability.275 This means that most adhesion contracts—from
employment contracts, to cell phone contracts, to those entered into by the
merchants and American Express—will either expressly or implicitly
proscribe class actions and will almost always be upheld.276 At least as to
state law claims, plaintiffs will no longer attempt to bring small-dollar
claims because it is not economically viable when the expense would dwarf
any potential recovery.277 As a result, businesses may implement the exact
scheme the Discover Bank rule attempted to proscribe by explicitly or
implicitly embedding a class action waiver into its standard form
contract.278 Though Concepcion stated the Discover Bank rule was
preempted because it was overbroad, in light of the Court’s apparent
distaste for class arbitration it would likely come to a similar conclusion

Court has taken a hands-off approach to arbitration agreements and that unequal
bargaining power is not a sufficient reason to hold an agreement unenforceable).
274. See Concepcion, 131 S. Ct. at 1750 (reasoning that the Discover Bank’s
requirement of adhesion contract failed to limit the rule’s scope because most consumer
contracts are adhesive (citing Carbajal v. H & R Block Tax Servs., Inc., 372 F.3d 903,
906 (7th Cir. 2004)).
275. See Myriam Gilles & Gary Friedman, After Class: Aggregate Litigation in
the Wake of AT&T Mobility v. Concepcion, 79 U. CHI. L. REV. 623, 627 (2012)

(noting that most arbitration agreements after Concepcion will be upheld because of the
sweeping holding); Myriam Gilles, Opting Out of Liability: The Forthcoming, NearTotal Demise of the Modern Class Action, 104 MICH. L. REV. 373, 378 (2005) (noting
that the class action mechanism is necessary to incentivize businesses to avoid the
misconduct that leads to such consequential liability).
276. See Stolt-Nielsen S.A. v. AnimalFeeds Int’l Corp., 130 S. Ct. 1758, 1774-76
(2010) (holding that courts cannot compel parties to submit to class arbitration if the
arbitration agreement does not expressly permit it); Gilmer v. Interstate/Johnson Lane
Corp., 500 U.S. 20, 31-32 (1991) (finding that claims arising out of employment
contracts are arbitrable because arbitration is not inherently inconsistent with federal
employment statutes).
277. See Concepcion, 131 S. Ct. at 1752 (holding that state laws that tend to disfavor
arbitration are preempted by the FAA); see also Carnegie v. Household Int’l, Inc., 376
F.3d 656, 661 (7th Cir. 2004) (recognizing that when a plaintiff’s expected damages are
infinitesimal compared to potential costs and no claims can be aggregated, no plaintiff
will bring a claim).
278. See Concepcion, 131 S. Ct. at 1746 (describing the Discover Bank rule that
attempted to catch businesses engaging in the kind of fraudulent behavior complained
of by the Concepcions); Stolt-Nielsen, 130 S. Ct. at 1774-76 (finding that an arbitration
agreement that did not mention the availability of class proceedings implicitly
prohibited it).
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under a case-by-case test because the FAA would still preempt state law.279
As a result, small-dollar state law claims across the board would go largely
unresolved, and businesses would not be held accountable for the sorts of
violations that typically give rise to class actions.280
Now that the Court has rejected the vindication of rights doctrine, the
class action mechanism may be largely unavailable in both state and federal
courts.281 As a result, only the most affluent and dedicated of consumers
would be able to bring private actions, and those who are not as fortunate
would be out of luck.282 This is arguably a far broader holding than what
Concepcion states; Concepcion merely proscribed an overbroad definition
of what is unconscionable when the instant parties actually could vindicate
their rights in bilateral arbitration.283 The Court’s conclusion that the
vindication of rights doctrine conflicts with the FAA has essentially ruled
out unconscionability as a defense that falls under the savings clause,
which the majority expressly chose not to do in Concepcion.284 Further, by
incorporating the savings clause, Congress clearly intended for some
arbitration agreements to still be unenforceable.285 The FAA was not
meant to bar claims that otherwise could not go forward without class
actions; it only intended to provide a more efficient choice of forum.286
279. See Jean R. Sternlight, As Mandatory Binding Arbitration Meets the Class
Action, Will the Class Action Survive?, 42 WM & MARY L. REV. 1, 22-23 (2000)
(noting the recent Supreme Court has indicated a strong preference for mandatory
arbitration and set precedent to ensure that arbitration clauses will be enforced in most
situations).
280. See, e.g., Acorn v. Household Int’l, Inc., 211 F. Supp. 2d 1160, 1169 (N.D. Cal.
2002) (noting that plaintiffs must be able to vindicate their rights to give businesses the
incentive to avoid conduct that leads to class actions in the first place).
281. See David S. Schwartz, Claim-Suppressing Arbitration: The New Rules, 87
IND. L.J. 239, 239 (2012) (positing that the Court has effectively rendered arbitration
clauses per se enforceable, so defendants can use class action waivers in arbitration
agreements to immunize themselves from facing liability).
282. See Eisen v. Carlisle & Jacquelin, 417 U.S. 156, 161 (1974) (recognizing that
when damages are inconsequential, proceeding as a class is the only realistic option for
resolving those disputes).
283. See Concepcion, 131 S. Ct. at 1750 (overturning Discover Bank because the
rule it espoused was not sufficiently limited to prevent any party to a consumer contract
from demanding class arbitration ex post).
284. See id. at 1753-55 (Thomas, J., concurring) (writing separately to suggest that
the only applicable defenses under the savings clause were those relating to the making
of an agreement, such as fraud or duress, and unconscionability was an invalid
defense).
285. See Doctor’s Assoc., Inc. v. Casarotto, 517 U.S. 681, 687 (1996) (recognizing
that the FAA savings clause permits courts to invalidate arbitration agreements for
traditional contract defenses such as unconscionability).
286. See Concepcion, 131 S. Ct. at 1759 (Breyer, J., dissenting) (positing how

http://digitalcommons.wcl.american.edu/jgspl/vol21/iss4/7

46

Wolf: "To a Hammer Everything Looks Like a Nail": The Supreme Court's .

2013]

DISTINGUISHING CONCEPCION

997

In order to ensure that the class action mechanism is not eviscerated,
Congress should consider amending the FAA to make explicit that
arbitration agreements would be unenforceable if their provisions would
preclude plaintiffs from effectively vindicating their rights in arbitration.287
Then, it would be clear when enforcing an arbitration agreement would
compromise a federal statute because the FAA itself would be
compromised.288
V. CONCLUSION
Because the Second Circuit’s holding in Italian Colors is entirely
consistent with prior Supreme Court precedent, its holding should not have
been disturbed by the Supreme Court.289 Under Section Two of the FAA,
the Court should have found that an arbitration agreement is unenforceable
when the plaintiffs provide persuasive evidence that arbitration does not
provide an adequate forum for vindicating their federal statutory rights.290
Arbitration is an inadequate forum for vindicating statutory rights when the
cost of admission, including necessary expert fees, is so prohibitively
expensive that a plaintiff will be precluded from bringing a claim.291 As a
result of the Court’s ruling, we can no longer ensure that arbitration
agreements are only enforced when arbitration provides a change in forum
and does not require plaintiffs to forgo substantive rights, as envisioned by
the FAA.292

arbitration would actually be carried out in practice had not been fully fleshed out when
the FAA became law, and the legislative history suggests it would primarily be sought
to resolve disputes of fact, not law).
287. See Gilles & Friedman, supra note 275, at 652 (noting an attempt in Congress
to provide that class action waivers are unenforceable in standard-form consumer and
employment contracts).
288. See Mitsubishi Motors Corp. v. Soler Chrysler-Plymouth, Inc., 473 U.S. 614,
627-37 (1985) (finding that the applicable federal statute is not served if the terms of an
arbitration agreement effectively preclude the prospective litigants from vindicating
their federal statutory rights).
289. See Italian Colors III, 667 F.3d 204, 214 (2d Cir.) (utilizing the vindication of
rights doctrine because it is consistent with Green Tree and Mitsubishi Motors, which
have not been overruled by the Court), reh’g en banc denied, 681 F.3d 139 (2d Cir.),
cert. granted sub nom. Am. Express Co. v. Italian Colors Rest., 133 S. Ct. 594 (2012),
overruled by 133 S. Ct. 2304 (2013).
290. See Green Tree Fin. Corp.-Ala. v. Randolph, 531 U.S. 79 (2000) (holding that
prohibitive costs can preclude a plaintiff from effectively vindicating statutory rights).
291. See Bradford v. Rockwell Semiconductor Sys., Inc., 238 F.3d 549, 556 (4th
Cir. 2001) (finding that any form of prohibitive costs is relevant to determine whether a
plaintiff can vindicate her rights, not just those unique to arbitration).
292. See Mitsubishi Motors Corp. v. Soler Chrysler-Plymouth, Inc., 473 U.S. 614,
628 (1985) (noting that the non-drafter of an arbitration clause does not waive her
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federal statutory rights simply by agreeing to arbitrate a statutory claim, as long as
arbitration merely represents a change in forum).

http://digitalcommons.wcl.american.edu/jgspl/vol21/iss4/7

48

